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Door locks connected to the internet, also known as smart locks, offer more convenience and 
security to control access to a place if compared to conventional locks that use physical keys or 
with those that use keypads. For instance, smart locks are managed remotely and even if someone 
once had access permission at some point, they cannot copy the key to attempt unauthorized access 
later. Those benefits, however, might be compromised due to the centralized system architecture 
offered by locks’ vendors and manufacturers which allow users to control their devices - someone 
could gain access over the user’s device and data. 
 This work explores how a permissionless blockchain – the public network of the Ethereum 
blockchain - can be leveraged to build a convenient and secure smart lock system, while giving 
the device owners full control over their devices by eliminating the central authority. It proposes 
an architecture and discusses in-depth the required components and other factors that must be taken 
into consideration while designing and implementing the system. Furthermore, a proof-of-concept 
application based on people that rent their places using hospitality services like Airbnb is 
implemented. The system allows hosts to remotely manage guests' permissions, delegate 
management rights to others, and allow guests to use a feature that blocks the owner’s permission 
to unlock the device during their stay. 
 The proof-of-concept is evaluated regarding its functionalities, how long they take to be 
processed by the blockchain, and how much they cost to be executed. Among the findings are: (i) 
the proposed architecture and implementation were capable of delivering the expected behaviors 
for the smart lock functionalities; (ii) the delay associated with using the Ethereum blockchain are 
reasonable and fit the application use cases; (iii) besides the one-time-only operation to deploy the 
smart contract in the blockchain, the cost yielded for all other actions stayed below CAD 0.40, 
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Conventional door locks based on keys have some limitations, mainly due to the necessity to handle 
somebody else a key to allow them to open the door. Those keys can be copied, stolen, or lost, and 
replacing the secret is usually expensive. Door locks with keypads are an alternative to give access 
without the physical exchange of keys, but they face some similar issues than before. The code can 
also be copied, stolen, or forgotten, and although changing it is more feasible than previously, it 
requires physical interaction with the device. Door locks connected to the internet, also known as 
smart locks, solve those issues. The device is managed remotely, over the internet, and people do 
not have to handle physical keys or unique passcodes to others anymore. Therefore, they are a more 
secure and convenient alternative to manage access to places. On the other hand, the centralized 
system architecture used by those locks still contains some security and privacy risks. 
Smart lock manufacturers provide users with an online interface to manage the devices 
(August, 2020; Friday, 2020; Google, 2020; Kwikset, 2020). Those solutions are entirely owned 
and controlled by the company, which means that they have full access over the user’s data and 
device. Intentionally or not, someone could read, edit, or delete user’s data and even acquire access 
to the lock without their consent. The same could happen if a hacker successfully attacked the 
company or even one of their IT providers, for example. In summary, a user must trust the smart 
lock manufacturer in order to use it. 
Blockchain has been proposed to eliminate the need of central authorities – stakeholders 
with control power - in some applications since it allows trustless interaction between unknown 
parties through a decentralized architecture (Christidis and Devetsikiotis, 2016; Lu, 2018). Among 
hundreds of options, the Ethereum blockchain is one of the most popular choices to explore those 
capabilities. Ethereum supports smart contracts - pieces of codes that run in the blockchain - which 
enables the system to enforce custom rules or behaviors. One of the most exciting features about it 
is that once a smart contract is deployed, no one can change it, and it is only possible to interact 
with it honoring the programmed rules and behaviors. It is crucial to note, however, that Ethereum 
is not a single piece solution when it comes to building decentralized applications. Designing a full 
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application to leverage it requires various components that must be chosen carefully among a 
complex range of possibilities. 
Anyone can join and be part of the public Ethereum blockchain network, which indicates 
that anyone can see the transactions and other information about it. While this transparency is 
essential to the blockchain architecture, it also brings some privacy concerns, and it must be taken 
into consideration when building on the platform. A further characteristic that must be paid 
attention to is the economics of the Ethereum network. In order to the blockchain to properly work 
and avoid attacks, users must pay fees to execute transactions in it. Additionally, Ethereum needs 
time to process those transactions which impose a latency to actions that depend on the blockchain. 
Therefore, the cost to use it and latency times should be considered when designing solutions with 
Ethereum.  
Finally, this thesis proposes a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) application that builds a smart lock 
system that uses the Ethereum blockchain, discussing all the relevant considerations from 
designing the application to building and evaluating it. This work is organized as follows: (i) 
Chapter two presents the problem definition and the research questions and objectives; (ii) Chapter 
three brings a literature review on the blockchain, and its application to smart homes and smart 
door locks; (iii) Chapter four defines the PoC application and discuss the system architecture to 
build it; (iv) Chapter five details all the considerations and decisions about the implementation of 
the PoC; (v) Chapter six presents the experiments to evaluate the functionalities, performance, and 
operating cost of the PoC; (vi) Chapter seven brings the conclusion about the work, its 









Alice needs to give Bob access to her house, but she cannot keep locking and unlocking the door 
for him every time he needs to enter or leave the place. The simplest solution one could think is 
that Alice can just handle Bob a key. Then, he can use it to enter and leave her house as needed 
and, once his access is no longer required, he returns the key to Alice. That solution, however, 
hides a much more complex set of requirements and assumptions behind the key exchange. 
First, an assumption is made that Alice and Bob can physically exchange the key between 
them. In addition to that, Alice expects that: 
• Her door can only be unlocked by her specific and unique secret, that she holds 
through her key; 
• Bob is the only one that will use the key - i.e., the permission is individual and 
personalized; 
• She is in control of Bob’s access and that she can cease it at her will; 
• No one besides her can control the access to her place – or maybe someone that she 
explicitly trust to do it for her. Therefore, she controls the access management. 
Note that, with minor modifications, a similar set of requirements could be described if 
Alice would manage access to her workplace, to her school locker, to her car, among other physical 
places that she might be in charge of the access control. 
Regular door locks that use physical keys fail to meet most of Alice’s requirements because: 
• Bob can make copies of that key without her consent – she is not in control over 
Bob’s access; 
• Anyone with that same key can successfully open the lock – the access is not 
personalized; 




Moreover, exchanging a physical key is inconvenient, and so is changing the lock’s secret, 
which is also expensive. 
Door locks that use keypads show some improvements when compared to physical keys, 
which are mainly related to Alice’s control of one’s access. However, it still fails to meet all the 
requirements because anyone that knows the passcode can type it in and successfully open the lock. 
On the other hand, exchanging the secret is more convenient than before, and so is changing the 
secret when needed – although it requires physical access to the device to modify it. 
Door locks controlled remotely through the internet solve most of those issues found in the 
previous locks. It is possible, easy, and convenient to create and manage personalized permissions. 
However, Alice’s control over managing the access might be at risk. The lock’s management 
platforms offered by vendors and manufacturers are entirely under their control, and they could 
potentially override Alice’s permissions – either intentionally or by suffering hacker attacks, for 
instance. 
The blockchain has been proposed to eliminate the necessity of central authorities in various 
scenarios, which is precisely the problem with the current door locks connected to the internet, 
where the lock’s provider is a central authority. 
At last, this work proposes and implements a smart lock solution – partially illustrated in 
Figure 2.1 – which provides Alice with the following functionalities: 
1. Assign individualized permission to open her lock over a time frame – e.g., let Bob 
unlock the door from June 15th, 3 PM, to 9:30 AM of the 18th; 
2. Have full control over one’s access to her lock – e.g., she can remove Bob’s 
permission to unlock the door, and there is nothing that Bob can do to use his past 
authorization to unlock the device afterward; 
3. Allow individuals to control the access management on her behalf – e.g., she can 
allow Diana to assign permissions to open the device; 
4. Have full control over the access management of her lock – e.g., only Alice and 
people she authorizes can assign permissions to the device, and she is the only one 
who can create and edit authorizations; 
5. Manage the lock remotely over the internet – i.e., execute the actions above without 




Figure 2.1 – Smart lock proposal representation 
 
2.1 Research Questions 
 
1. How can a smart lock solution be implemented using a permissionless blockchain to 
address the five functionalities presented above? 
2. How much time would the proposed solution take to perform the management actions listed 
earlier? 
3. How much money would it cost to run the proposed solution? 
 
2.2 Research Objectives 
 
1. Design and implement a smart lock system architecture using the blockchain 
2. Regarding the five functionalities previously described: 
a. Verify that the proposed system delivers them 
b. Evaluate how long their executions are expected to take – i.e., the delay between 
the user sending an action and getting the corresponding response 
c. Evaluate how much money their executions are expected to cost – i.e., how much 








This chapter presents a literature review that covers the blockchain technology, which centers on 
the main characteristics and applications of blockchain that are relevant to building a smart lock 
solution. Table 3.1, found on the last page of this chapter, shows a summary of the literature review 
conducted. 
 
3.1  Blockchain 
 
Blockchain can be explained, in summary, as a distributed ledger of transactions or, more 
specifically, a distributed append-only timestamped data structure (Casino et al., 2018). Satoshi 
Nakamoto (2008) introduced a cryptocurrency called Bitcoin, which is known as the first practical 
implementation of a blockchain. The proposed public peer-to-peer (P2P) network solved the 
double-spending problem – where one spends the same resource twice - through a consensus 
algorithm called proof-of-work (PoW), which enabled untrusted parties to execute transactions 
without relying on a central authority to validate and orchestrate it, e.g., a bank. Through 
asymmetric cryptography, users digitally sign their transactions, which ensures that the user indeed 
sent it and that the content was not exploited along the way. Following, those transactions are 
broadcasted to every node in the network, and inserted into blocks, with its corresponding 
timestamp, a process called mining. Blocks are then chained to each other in chronological order 
through a hash function reference. Any changes made to past transactions would alter the block’s 
resulting hash number, causing a break in the chain, easily verifiable by anyone. In other words, 
all nodes in the network hold a transparent and persistent copy of the ledger. Consequently, unlike 
traditional centralized systems, there is not a central component – like a server or a database – that 
attackers could exploit to tamper with the data. 
Bitcoin introduced a powerful combination of techniques that allowed the exchange and 
storage of cryptocurrency in a trustless and distributed environment while avoiding the previously 
required use of a central authority. Undoubtedly revolutionary, the application of Bitcoin was 
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somehow limited to simple exchanges of cryptocurrency values. The architecture, on the other 
hand, offered the necessary characteristics to implement the idea of smart contracts proposed about 
a decade earlier by Szabo (1994, 1997). The author described the implementation of contracts in 
computer code, where a protocol would automatically enforce all the agreed terms between the 
parties. The inclusion of this feature into the blockchain technology enabled an extensive set of 
possible applications to the technology, going beyond financial to business, IoT, education, public 
and social services, to name a few (Casino et al., 2018; Zheng et al., 2018; Brandão et al., 2018). 
This movement towards smart contracts is so relevant that it created a turning point in blockchain 
history. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are referred to as being part of the Blockchain 1.0 
generation, while those with smart contracts functionalities are labeled as Blockchain 2.0 (Lu, 
2018). 
Generally, a blockchain will have mechanisms in place: (i) that allow participants to form 
a peer-to-peer network; (ii) that allow users to be uniquely addressable in the network and sign 
their transactions; (iii) that allow the network to verify and process transactions; (iv) that allow the 
network to agree on the state of the ledger; (v) optionally, it might include smart contracts features 
that allow the execution of computational steps given a particular transaction occurs; (vi) that allow 
the maintenance and upgrade of the blockchain itself; (vii) optionally, it might restrain access to 
the network (Christidis and Devetsikiotis, 2016; Tama et al., 2017). The last mechanism, used to 
control access to the network, determines if a blockchain is public, private, or consortium, also 
referred to as federated or hybrid (Buterin, 2015). In public blockchains, also known as 
permissionless, there is no restriction on who can participate in the network. Anyone can send 
transactions, join the consensus process, among other capabilities. On the contrary, a fully private 
blockchain, categorized as permissioned, centralizes the mining capability to a single node, 
implements a whitelist of users allowed to be part of the network, and might even constrain what 
kind of action each user can perform. Consortium is also a permissioned blockchain, which limits 
access to the network, but instead of centralizing the consensus process on a single entity, it defines 
a set of authorized nodes to do it. In other words, its semi-decentralized topology is a hybrid 
approach between public and private blockchains (Memon et al., 2018). 
Finally, a summary of the key characteristics of blockchain technology is: (i) 
decentralization; (ii) transparency; (iii) immutability, persistency; (iv) privacy, pseudo-anonymity; 
(v) auditability; (vi) reliability; (vii) versatility (Seebacher and Schüritz, 2017; Zheng et al., 2018). 
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3.2  Ethereum 
 
One of the leading players on blockchain 2.0 is Ethereum, which was conceptualized by Vitalik 
Buterin in late 2013 (Buterin, 2014a; Buterin, 2014b), and Gavin Wood launched its first 
specification in early 2014 (Wood, 2014). The blockchain supports smart contracts by including a 
built-in Turing-complete programming language, known as Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) 
code, which allows users to write arbitrary rules and create decentralized applications (Ethereum 
White Paper, 2019). The EVM code is a low-level bytecode language, but smart contracts are 
usually written in high-level languages. For instance, Solidity and Vyper are considered the most 
popular options for writing smart contracts, although others are available (Ethereum Developer 
Resources, 2019). Smart contracts deployed in the blockchain are also immutable, meaning that 
once they are sent there, no one can change its code, not even to fix bugs. 
 Ethereum blockchain contains two types of accounts: (i) externally owned accounts; (ii) 
contract accounts. The difference between them is that a private key controls the former, while the 
latter is controlled by code. However, both can hold a balance of Ether (ETH), the platform’s 
currency token. 
Since every transaction demands some work from the network to process it, Ethereum 
charges fees – specified in unities of Gas - to avoid abuses and to prevent infinite loops execution 
in smart contracts (Wood, 2014; Ethereum White Paper, 2019). In practice, it works as a limit to 
how many computational steps are allowed to happen. Each of those steps corresponds to a low-
level operator that has a fixed cost associated with it. If the Gas allowance assigned by a transaction 
is not enough to fully execute the action, all the computation is reversed, but the Gas was spent 
whatsoever. Miners are the nodes responsible for running the network mostly, and those fees are 
used to reward them for their work. They can even choose to ignore transactions if they find the 
Gas price set by the creator too low. In other words, the system imposes a trade-off on the 
transactors between Gas price and processing time. 
It is possible to use Ethereum by either joining the public network or running a 
private/hybrid version, and each approach offers advantages and disadvantages. Zheng et al. (2018) 
summarize the main characteristics of public, private, and consortium blockchains. Public 
blockchains, which are largely decentralized, offer higher levels of immutability due to the 
difficulty of tampering with the data. At the same time, a large number of nodes to propagate 
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transactions and blocks to, limits transaction throughput and raises latency times. Private and 
consortium blockchains, on the other hand, restrain the number of participants in the consensus 
process and the network. As a result, transactions are processed faster than before, but the difficulty 
to tamper with this centralized network architecture is lower. Besides the tread-off between security 
and latency, there is a third critical characteristic that must be taken into consideration, privacy. In 
public blockchains, all transactions are visible to the public, while permissioned blockchains 
control access to it. Finally, to use a public network means that there are no infrastructure costs 
associated with it, contrary to the private approach where one is responsible for setting up and 
managing the network completely (Casino et al., 2018). In addition to that, once various peers are 
using the network and holding value in it, there are many people with high interest in monitoring 
and keeping it secure, decentralizing the management as well. 
It is undeniable that there are many variables involved in the decision to use a public or a 
hybrid blockchain. However, one can argue that decentralization is one of the main characteristics 
of blockchains, and partially or entirely centralizations break that premise, or at least weakness it 
substantially (Buterin, 2015). In fact, the Ethereum whitepaper (Ethereum White Paper, 2019) 
states that one of the reasons to develop Ethereum was to offer a blockchain platform that would 
allow people to build custom applications on top of, instead of bootstrapping their custom version 
of Bitcoin. The authors argue that the majority of those custom applications are too small to run 
their own blockchain network with a proper decentralized consensus protocol. 
  
3.3  Privacy In Blockchain 
 
As explained before, privacy is a crucial factor to take into consideration when using a public 
blockchain due to its transparency feature. Feng et al. (2019) conducted a survey on privacy issues 
related to blockchain and divided them into two types, identity and transaction. Identity privacy is 
about decoupling real identities from the transactions, as well as the links between transactions. 
Blockchain usually uses a random number to represent someone’s address, but it provides limited 
privacy. It is possible to monitor the network and reveal users’ identities, and that is why it is said 
to offer pseudo-anonymity (Halpin and Piekarska, 2017; Tikhomirov, 2017; Feng et al., 2019). 
Transaction privacy, on the other hand, means to protect the transaction content from public access, 
instead of broadcasting the data itself. 
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 Different research has been conducted to study those privacy limitations in blockchains, 
and generally, they can be separated into two areas, they either provide tools to improve existing 
blockchains, or they propose creating new ones that address the issue from the design. An interested 
reader can find more details about these methods, privacy-aware blockchains, and further 
discussions in the works of Mercer (2016), Buterin (2016), Wahab (2018), and Feng et al. (2019). 
Wahab (2018) argues, which is corroborated by Unterweger et al. (2018), that it is not feasible to 
run state-of-the-art privacy technologies on blockchains that do not consider that constraint from 
conception. The reason is the high computation time and power that is required from them, which 
leads to scalability limitations, and high costs to run them in smart contract platforms, e.g., 
Ethereum. 
 The threat imposed by the data exposure will differ based on how the blockchain is being 
used. Generally speaking, the privacy issues related to the use case of simple cryptocurrency 
exchange relies mostly on people eventually learning the account owner identity, the account 
balance, and the detailed history of transactions executed by the account – in no particular order. 
In addition to that, all those transactions contain information about both parties involved, the value 
of the transactions, among others. On the other hand, for those applications built on blockchains 
that support smart contracts, the analysis is not so straightforward. Since the transactions can carry 
any custom data and perform custom actions, the threats will be directly related to the context of 
that specific use case and how the smart contract is implemented. 
 To illustrate those privacy concerns related to public blockchains, the e-voting application 
- a system that allows people to vote through the internet - is a good scenario. To build such a 
system, besides meeting high-security requirements, voters’ privacy must be addressed. When 
someone casts a vote, it is not ideal that other people have knowledge of the details, but it is crucial 
that anyone can verify the validity of a vote, as well as that the eventual result is reliable. Ethereum 
is a popular choice of blockchain to create and study e-voting applications, and a variety of 
approaches have been proposed (McCorry et al., 2017; Yavuz et al., 2018; Li, 2019). However, 
more important than discussing the details, findings, and limitations of those works, is to highlight 
two ideas: (i) the necessity to consider privacy when building applications for blockchains; (ii) the 
privacy threats depend on the use case context and how it was implemented. An interested reader 
can find related discussions applied to auction application built with Ethereum smart contracts in 
the works of Galal and Youssef (2019a, 2019b). 
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3.4  Blockchain Applied To Smart Home 
 
Several definitions for the term smart home is found in the literature (Schiefer, 2015). Widely, they 
refer to a house that incorporates devices capable of executing automated tasks, and that can be 
controlled remotely by the users. For instance, devices might be light bulbs, air-conditioners, house 
appliances, door locks, among many others. Since they are being used to control different aspects 
inside people’s homes, they have a direct impact on their life and well-being, and successful attacks 
can result in severe consequences – e.g., leaking of private information, monitoring user’s activity, 
opening doors, to name a few. For that reason, the use of blockchain has been proposed in different 
ways to enhance the smart home environment. 
Rahman et al. (2019) present an idea to enable secure and privacy-preserving rent of 
Internet of Things (IoT) devices, introducing a marketplace that gathers IoT providers, travel 
agencies, hotels, and guests. This sharing economy of devices – e.g., lock or a light bulb - makes 
it possible for businesses to offer those products to guests, without owning it. Still, the system 
addresses some security and privacy challenges encountered when sharing such resources with 
third parties. It is done by using Ethereum and Hyperledger blockchains, InterPlanetary File System 
(IPFS) off-chain storage of multimedia data, data processing at the edge to store information more 
efficiently, among other components and features. However, there are a variety of ways to write 
smart contracts and interact with the blockchain, which can show different privacy and security 
levels. Therefore, a discussion on the implementation is crucial. One more element that requires 
investigation is the cost to run the proposed solution. 
Set to explore the capabilities of combining IoT with blockchain, Joseph and Navaie (2019) 
propose a system to manage home appliances and resources supply in rented places. In their design, 
landlords can write conditions to supply resources to tenants – e.g., water and energy – and when 
a successful payment into the smart contract occurs, the blockchain automatically provides the 
resource. The system is built using a private Ethereum network customized to lower the proof-of-
work (PoW) requirements, resulting in lower transaction confirmation times. The authors argue 
that since the participants must be authenticated and authorized into the network by the landlord, 
the overall security of the blockchain would not be compromised by the lower PoW values. 
Unfortunately, there are other vulnerabilities when adopting private blockchain networks that must 
be considered. First, the number of nodes is low, as probably would the number of transactions be, 
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which makes 51% attacks easier to perform. Second, this topology requires significant technical 
knowledge from the landlords to properly maintain the network. Although they know the identity 
of all the participants, identify attacks, misconduct, and revert those actions is not easy. Third, the 
participants might not have many incentives to attack the network and compromise their supplies, 
as stated by the authors, but if any of them gets hacked, the system would be exposed. One can 
argue that this issue described is not relevant when dealing with water and energy supply control, 
once an outside attacker would hardly benefit from it. However, when dealing with door locks, as 
proposed in the future work section, the issue is pertinent. Lastly, all participants of the network 
would be able to access transaction information on the system. In which case, a privacy analysis 
would be interesting to reveal what kind of information is available for the participants of the 
network. For instance, the lock proposed as future work is said to record every entry and exit of 
people, which is a sensitive security piece of information to be available. 
One more work exploring the intersection of blockchain and smart home IoT devices to 
improve on existing security and privacy issues was developed by Aung and Tantidham (2017). 
Their design uses a private Ethereum network, composed by a single node, to communicate and 
control temperature sensors and air conditioner equipment. This architecture presents similar 
limitations and risks to those discussed before on the work of Joseph and Navaie (2019), which 
also chose to run a private blockchain. In this case, however, the risk is even higher, once there is 
only a single node in the network. In addition to that, the proposed design includes a central 
database to offload some data from the blockchain, which lacks some discussion. It is not clear 
what information is recorded there, and how much its use can compromise the acquired privacy 
and security from the blockchain. The same architecture can be achieved through a variety of 
implementation strategies, and authors must explain the low-level system details to assess the 
features of their designs effectively. An example of this idea is the work done by Xu et al. (2018). 
Although they present a similar application, which applies the Ethereum private Blockchain to 
smart home systems, their detailed discussion enhances the understanding of this type of 
architecture and enable new analyses. Their work demonstrates a smart home application using 
Ethereum that monitors humidity and temperature of a room, then acts on it based on predefined 
thresholds. For instance, if the room temperature is found higher than set by the user, the smart 
contract would turn on the air conditioner. The authors describe the miner and node topology 
required to properly run the system, which includes the use of two computers, each one assigned 
13 
 
to run two Ethereum miner nodes. This is done to improve security and take the computationally 
expensive miner responsibility from the sensor devices. It is not explicitly stated, but it seems that 
each place being monitored would run its own private network, or in other words, each user would 
have two machines running Ethereum miner nodes. There are some issues with that approach that 
might contradict the increase in security strategy and even the applicability of the system. First, it 
requires that the users keep two computers turned on twenty-four hours, which seems a waste of 
energy compared to the monitoring task in hand. Second, those computers are inside the same 
internet network, which means that if someone gains access to it, they potentially can reach all the 
miners – overall, the same that would happen if they were running a single miner node. Even when 
that is not the case, and attackers only acquire access to one of the machines, it would still represent 
50% of the mining power, compromising the reliability of the blockchain. 
An alternative use of a private blockchain to build smart home systems was proposed by 
Zhou et al. (2018). The work proposes a framework that combines a private blockchain network, 
presumably Hyperledger, with a public one. The topology determines that each house has its private 
network - with one miner node - and IoT devices, that are each a non-mining node. The devices 
send their data through smart contracts to be stored in the private blockchain, and they can 
communicate with each other to exchange information and services. The public blockchain is used 
to form a network of homes, that shares IoT services, and it receives the data from the private 
blockchains periodically. Although the architecture allows new functionalities not included in the 
previous works, it still faces most of the security and management issues discussed above on using 
private blockchains, notably when it contains a single miner node. Nonetheless, when a public 
blockchain is used, there are privacy concerns that must be addressed, and the authors do not 
provide details about it. 
Following their previously discussed work on how to integrate IoT devices with blockchain 
to build Smart Home Systems (SHS), Aung and Tantidham (2019) present a new application 
inspired on their design. The authors propose an SHS, once again based on the private Ethereum 
blockchain, that integrates the system with external Home Service Providers (HSP) to send 
emergency calls given a specific condition occurs. For example, if the home security system detects 
a break-in, it could automatically send an emergency call to the police, and maybe to the security 
company hired by the household. Generally, a combination of sensors and other monitoring devices 
that identifies a predefined behavior could generate emergency calls to the correspondent HSP, 
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such as the fire department, a health service agency, the hardware manufacturer, to name a few. 
One positive aspect of this work is the security and privacy awareness of the design, which uses a 
combination of encrypted messages and IPFS to prevent forgery and unintended access to 
emergency calls. Moreover, the authors provide a detailed explanation of how the system works 
and discuss the privacy and security aspects of various parts of it. Contrary to their last proposed 
architecture, the householders do not have to run Ethereum miner nodes, which is now the 
responsibility of the HSP. Although the design shows an improvement from the last application 
regarding the Ethereum private network usage, resulting in a potential increase in security, one can 
argue that the effort required to form and maintain a new network might not be worth compared to 
leveraging the existing public Ethereum network. In addition to that, given the smart contracts 
implementations, it seems that some information about the homeowners could be viewed, and even 
manipulated, by anyone participating in the network. Since potentially there will be different HSP 
collaborating in the network, this might represent an issue. 
 
3.5  Blockchain Applied To Smart Locks 
 
Aligned with the smart home definition introduced in section 3.4 (Schiefer, 2015), a smart lock can 
be described as a lock device capable of executing automated lock and unlock tasks, and that can 
be controlled remotely by the users. 
Han et al. (2017) propose a smart door lock system, based on the blockchain, to overcome 
vulnerabilities to forgery and hacking encountered in smart locks. The work proposes the device’s 
hardware components, which include interfaces for three sensors to monitor the surroundings and 
aid the system in decision-making situations. The capabilities offered by this solution are 
lock/unlock the door given that the user is within a determined distance range from the device, 
detect indoor intrusion while the device is locked, and finally detect outside intrusion, like someone 
trying to tamper with the lock. Although the work addresses some smart lock vulnerabilities from 
an appealing perspective, combining blockchain and sensors, it is still in early stages, and more 
information and evaluation is required. First, it is not clear where the described functionalities run, 
embedded on the device, or deployed on the blockchain, which is not the same. Second, the 
proposed architecture apparently uses a custom private blockchain, either built from scratch or 
derived from an existing one, e.g., Ethereum. Given that, the devices and users must authenticate 
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themselves to the network and manage their accounts in order to interact with it, processes that are 
not discussed. In addition to that, the system diagram suggests that the blockchain nodes are 
running on the users’ smartphone and on the smart lock itself. Since running a proof-of-work node 
usually requires computationally intensive operations, more discussion about the blockchain 
implementation and its interface with mobiles would be required. Moreover, the authors mention 
a reduction in the proof-of-work requirements to increase the transaction speed, but this might also 
lower the security of the blockchain. Furthermore, if their implementation requires a new private 
network to operate each smart lock, the number of participants would be low, maybe a few people 
that live in the house, for instance, which also compromises the blockchain security features. 
Therefore, to properly apply this solution requires a further investigation of the vulnerabilities of 
the custom blockchain. 
Zaparoli et al. (2019) identified convenience and security issues related to the exchange of 
keys between hosts, guests, and other stakeholders of Airbnb and other hospitality service 
providers. The work proposes a solution that includes a smart lock, a web platform to manage 
reservations, an Android app to communicate with the lock, and the use of Ethereum smart 
contracts to manage access. In the design, if someone wants to rent a property, they would open 
the reservation tool, book the place, pay for it, and when the time comes, they would access the 
venue using the Android app to unlock the door. An exciting feature introduced by this work is 
that, when a stay is active, only the guest can lock/unlock the device, not even the property 
managers or owner can open it. However, in many cases, people offering rent in such platforms 
also live in the place or have multiple bedrooms available, and the authors do not mention the 
support for those diversified access scenarios, which limits the application of their solution. 
Moreover, it is not clear if there are means to deal with guests’ no shows, for example. A further 
limitation in the proposed solution is the reservation platform, where the user books and pays for 
rent. If they must use this new system to work with the lock, it means that they would not be able 
to use popular platforms like Airbnb, which offers many benefits to them on top of booking and 
payment. 
Regarding the use of Ethereum and smart contracts by Zaparoli et al. (2019), some elements 
require further discussion. For instance, details about the smart contract implementation are not 
provided, which makes it hard to assess the security, privacy, and the functionalities coded. When 
working with a public blockchain, it is crucial to ensure that only authorized people can interact 
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with the contract, that people cannot exploit it somehow, that the functionalities are reliable, and 
pay attention to how much data about the user is publicly available. For example, assume a hack 
successfully occurs at the system’s database, it is essential to understand what the attackers could 
achieve with the information acquired on users and the smart contract addresses stored there. 
Besides security, privacy, and reliability, there is still the economic aspect of using Ethereum. The 
authors mention that for every new reservation, a new smart contract deploy happens in the 
blockchain, and this is one of the most expensive actions to execute (Wood, 2014). Therefore, 
further investigations about the operating costs to use the system are essential to understand its 
feasibility and propose alternative architectures to lower those values if necessary. About the 
proposed architecture, it relies on the server to lock/unlock the device, meaning that if it goes 
offline for any reason, the users would not be able to use the lock. For that reason, more discussion 
on that risk is necessary. Finally, the work is still in early stages, as discussed, but shows an 
interesting approach to address hospitality services challenges on access management. 
Table 3.1 – Literature review summary 
Topic Outcome References 
Blockchain It shows excellent characteristics, and it is suitable 
to build the proposed solution 
12 
Ethereum It shows excellent characteristics, and it is suitable 
to build the proposed solution 
8 
Privacy in blockchain One must pay attention to information transacted 
and recorded publicly in the blockchain 
12 
Blockchain applied to smart 
home 
The application shows potential, but further 
investigation is needed 
7 
Blockchain applied to smart 
locks 
The application shows potential, but further 









DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE 
 
Door locks are used worldwide to control access to places, and they are used in different situations, 
with particular frequencies, by certain people, in various contexts. Of course, open and close the 
lock are evident standard functionalities that a door lock should offer. However, it still requires the 
management of accesses and other auxiliary activities that might lead to context-specific 
requirements. Therefore, in order to explore the use of smart locks with blockchain, and guide the 
discussion within a clear scope, defining a proof-of-concept (PoC) use case scenario is a good idea. 
In the work of Zaparoli et al. (2019) discussed in the last chapter, the authors chose the hospitality 
service providers’ use case – e.g., Airbnb and hotels – to develop their smart lock proposal, which 
has attractive characteristics for a PoC in this thesis. Therefore, a similar approach is used here but 
restricted to the Airbnb scenario. Figure 4.1 shows a high-level overview of the proposed PoC. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Smart lock PoC overview 
Airbnb is a peer-to-peer hospitality service platform, and it allows property owners (hosts) 
to find people (guests) to rent and stay in their properties – houses, apartments, or even only single 
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rooms. Although all the booking process is facilitated by the website, where everything is done 
remotely and conveniently, challenges for both hosts and guests emerge when it comes to managing 
access to the rented places, which can compromise security, privacy, and convenience for them. 
First, it is significant to understand that Airbnb hosts might not be doing that as a full-time job but 
rather as an extra income source by renting their otherwise vacant spaces. Hosts, therefore, might 
have limited availability to deal with renting related tasks. Second, hosts might be using Airbnb to 
offer stays in their vacation properties – e.g., camping or beach houses – which they are not near 
to, creating even more challenges. 
The security, privacy, and convenience issues addressed in this work related to managing 
access to the place are directly dependent on the kind of door lock that the hosts are using in their 
places, being either conventional locks with physical keys, locks with keypad, or smart locks – 
locks with internet access. The following paragraphs show the discussion for each one of them. 
Conventional locks that use physical keys require hosts and guests to meet in person to 
exchange the door key. If their availability does not match, and they cannot agree on a meeting 
schedule for some reason, the host might choose to leave the key with third parties or leave it 
hidden and unattended somewhere. This potential sharing of keys, which can also be done by guests 
at any point during their stay, leads to a problem because anyone with the key can make copies of 
it, which can be used to access the place illegally later. An alternative for hosts would be to change 
the lock’s secret from time to time, ideally after every guest leaves, but it is not feasible, since 
changing the secret of this kind of lock is usually expensive, labor-intensive, and the duration of 
Airbnb bookings might be for as short as a single day stay. Besides making copies, people might 
also just lose the key, which would incur in the same expensive costs to replace the secret. That is 
why conventional door locks lack convenience and compromise security and privacy for both hosts 
and guests. 
Locks with keypad are an alternative to address some of the challenges with conventional 
locks. By using them, it is not mandatory that hosts and guests meet in person since they can 
exchange the access code remotely by various means. As a consequence, it also avoids the potential 
involvement of third parties that would have access to the key. However, it still faces some of the 
issues with the former lock. For example, people can still share the code with others, or someone 
can steal it by hearing, watching people type, intercepting the message where the code was 
exchanged, to name a few possibilities. In any case, anyone who knows the code can try to access 
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the place illegally later. On the other hand, with keypad’s locks, it is feasible to continually change 
the key, even daily, which reduces the risk when compared to conventional locks, but this 
convenience comes with an assumption. In order to change the access code, the host must do it in 
person, and as stated before, they are not always close to the place. Therefore, if that is not the case, 
this kind of lock will face similar threats than those discussed for locks with physical keys. 
Moreover, even when hosts are able to change the secret daily, they still face low convenience to 
manage them, keeping track of the current code, and updating people about it – e.g., family 
members, maintenance team. That is why, to a certain degree, door locks with keypads still 
compromise user’s convenience, security, and privacy. 
A third door lock alternative available are those equipped with an internet connection, also 
known as smart locks, which allow them to be controlled remotely, which brings more convenience 
than keypad locks. Besides the fact that it is not mandatory that hosts and guests meet in person to 
exchange keys, same as for keypad locks, now it is easy for hosts to manage access remotely. 
Accordingly, it reduces the probability that people that have had access in the past, or others that 
have acquired the code somehow, successfully open the lock illegally in the future. Although this 
solution definitely enhances convenience, security, and privacy, it does contain threats. The 
management platform offered to the users by the lock’s vendors or manufacturers is implemented 
through a centralized architecture, which they hold full control over. This control includes having 
access to all user’s data, having administrative power to edit or delete them, which can even mean 
including people in the lock’s access list, deleting someone from it, hiding information from users, 
or inferring when they are home or not. Therefore, employees of the company with bad intentions 
and hackers that successfully gain access to the company could potentially acquire control over the 
smart lock without the owner's knowledge. Similarly, depending on how the management platform 
was developed, the same could happen even if some of their IT providers are compromised – again, 
either an employee or hacker. Without getting into the discussion of what are the probabilities of 
those situations happening, the possibility itself must be enough to justify further investigations 
into how to enhance this architecture since door locks play a crucial security role in people's lives. 
Therefore, while extremely convenient, smart locks still compromise security and privacy for users. 
Finally, all locks discussed above bring privacy and security issues from an Airbnb guest 
perspective. With hosts using any of those devices, guests can never be sure that no one will enter 
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the place during their stay, since many might have the means to do so, and it can be either people 
with illegal access or even the owner.  
 Going back to the decision of why choosing the Airbnb use case as the PoC for this thesis, 
it was guided by the belief that a PoC should allow the development of a complete set of targeted 
requirements without being overly specialized. In that way, the discussion and knowledge gained 
with this study could be extensible to other use case scenarios. Generally speaking, the Airbnb 
scenario offers the expected lock and unlock requirements, but mixed with particular access 
requirements – e.g., expiry date - and business rules – e.g., ensure unique access for someone 
overruling even the device owner’s right. Therefore, the discussion in this context could be applied 
to other hospitality service scenarios as hotels, to access control in the workplace or universities, 
to gym or school lockers, to self-storage facilities, among others. Moreover, the smart lock itself 
allows the study also to be extended to other IoT devices that must perform any access control over 
data, functionality, or any other resource. 
 This chapter is organized as following: section 4.1 develops the PoC use cases, and section 
4.2 describes and discusses the system architecture. 
 
4.1  PoC Use Cases 
 
The PoC proposed has three actors, which are Host, Manager, and Guest. The Host is the smart 
lock owner and possibly the person who is putting the place to rent in Airbnb. A Manager is 
someone with management privileges over the device, which can only be provided by the Host. 
Managers have most of the Host’s functionalities, except for register, remove, and retrieve 
managers. In addition to that, a Manager cannot turn on the exclusive permission feature for itself. 
A Guest is anyone that the Host, or any Manager, will potentially provide permission to unlock the 
door. The definition of the use cases to be implemented in this work started by compiling a set of 
functional requirements (FR). Therefore, the use cases are derived from a clear representation of 
expectations from all stakeholders regarding the system’s functionalities. The functional 
requirements are presented below, where each of them contains a unique reference code, a 
description, and optionally details for the requirement’s preconditions, postconditions, or any 




Description The Host and Managers must be able to lock and unlock the door at any time 
Required info None 




Description The Host and Managers must be able to remotely provide a Guest with 
permission to lock and unlock the door 
Required info Guest 





Description The System must automatically deactivate a Guest’s permission once the 
expiry date and time set are past 





Description A Guest with permission must be able to lock and unlock the door at any time 
Required info None 
Precondition 1 The attempt to unlock occurs between the Guest permission’s start and expiry 
dates and time 




Description The Host and Managers must be able to withdraw a Guest’s permission 
before the expiry date remotely  
Required info None 
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Reference FR5 - Continue 




Description The Host and Managers must be able to allow one or more Guests to have 
simultaneous permission to lock and unlock the door 





Description The Host and Managers must be the only ones with the power to provide or 
withdraw Guests’ permission to lock and unlock the door 





Description A Guest must be able to check remotely the details about its permission to 
lock and unlock the door 
Required info None 
Precondition None 
Postcondition Start date and time, and expiry date and time are informed 
 
Reference FR9 
Description The Host and Managers must be able to remotely retrieve the Guests with 
permission to lock and unlock the door 
Required info None 
Precondition None 
Postcondition Guests are informed along with their start date and time, and expiry date and 
time 





Description The Host must be able to remotely provide one or more people with 
management privileges over the device 





Description The Host must be able to remove management privileges over the device 
from a Manager remotely  





Description The Host must be able to retrieve the Managers of the device remotely  
Required info None 
Precondition None 
Postcondition Managers are informed 
 
Reference FR13 
Description The Host must be allowed to remotely turn on the exclusive permission to 
lock and unlock the door for either itself, a Manager, or a Guest 
Required info The Host, a Manager, or a Guest 
Expiry date and time 
Precondition 1 Exclusive permission is inactive 
Precondition 2 The desired exclusive permission Actor must have active permission to lock 
and unlock the door 










Description A Manager must be allowed to remotely turn on the exclusive permission to 
lock and unlock the door only for a Guest 
Required info Guest 
Expiry date and time 
Precondition 1 Exclusive permission is inactive 
Precondition 2 The desired exclusive permission Guest must have active permission to lock 
and unlock the door 
Postcondition Guest’s exclusive permission is active 
 
Reference FR15 
Description The Host, Managers, and Guests must be able to remotely verify if they hold 
active exclusive permission to lock and unlock the door 





Description The Host and Managers must be able to remotely verify if anyone holds 
active exclusive permission to lock and unlock the door 
Required info None 
Precondition None 
Postcondition Exclusive permission status is informed 
If any, the Actor that holds the active exclusive permission is informed, along 
with its related expiry date 
 
Reference FR17 
Description Only one Actor can hold the exclusive permission to lock and unlock the 
door at a given moment 







Description Only the exclusive permission holder must be able to lock and unlock the 
door 
Required info None 




Description The Host, a Manager, or a Guest must be able to turn off only their own 
exclusive permission to lock and unlock the door 
Required info None 
Precondition The Actor must hold an active exclusive permission 
Postcondition Exclusive permission is inactive 
Figure 4.2 summarizes all the use cases (UC) derived from the functional requirements 
detailed above. Following the picture are detailed step-by-step behavior descriptions for each one 
of the eleven use cases. Alternative paths (AP) to the main success scenario (MSS) are also 
provided when a particular step has multiple possible outcomes. However, a given step can only 
happen through a single behavior, either the one described in the MSS or one of the AP. For 
example, UC1 - unlock and lock the door - has three possible behaviors for the second step of the 
MSS. For a given execution, either will happen behavior MSS.2, AP.2a, or AP.2b, followed by the 
next steps defined by each of them. It is possible to go back from alternative paths to the main 
success scenario, which can lead to other alternative behaviors. For instance, a given execution for 




Figure 4.2 - Smart lock use cases 
Reference UC1 
Name Unlock and lock the door 
Actors Host, Manager, Guest 
MSS 1. The Actor requests the smart lock to unlock or lock the door 
2. The smart lock verifies that the exclusive permission feature is OFF 
3. The smart lock verifies that the actor is the Host or a Manager 
4. The smart lock unlocks the door 
AP.1 2a.1. The smart lock verifies that the exclusive permission feature is ON 
2a.2. The smart lock verifies that the actor is the same that holds the exclusive 
permission 
2a.3. The smart lock unlocks the door 
AP.2 2b.1. The smart lock verifies that the exclusive permission feature is ON 
2b.2. The smart lock verifies that the actor is not the same that holds the exclusive 
permission 
2b.3. The smart lock ignores the request 
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Reference UC1 - Continue 
AP.3 3a.1. The smart lock verifies that the actor is a Guest 
3a.2. The smart lock verifies that the permission start date and time are in the past 
3a.3. The smart lock verifies that the permission expiry date and time are in the 
future 
3a.4. The smart lock unlocks the door 
AP.4 3b.1. The smart lock verifies that the actor is a Guest 
3b.2. The smart lock verifies that the permission start date and time are in the future 
3b.3. The smart lock ignores the request 
AP.5 3c.1. The smart lock verifies that the actor is a Guest 
3c.2. The smart lock verifies that the permission start date and time are in the past 
3c.3. The smart lock verifies that the permission expiry date and time are in the past 
3c.4. The smart lock ignores the request 
 
Reference UC2 
Name Register Guest 
Actors Host, Manager 
MSS 1. The Actor selects “Register Guest” in the smart lock management website 
2. The Actor informs the Guest, the permission start date and time, and the 
permission expiry date and time 
3. The Actor clicks “Register” 
4. The System verifies that the request comes from either the Host or a Manager 
5. The System verifies that the Guest does not have permission registered 
6. The System registers the Guest permission 
AP.1 4a.1. The System verifies that the request does not come from either the Host or a 
Manager 
4a.2. The System ignores the request 
4a.3. The System informs the error 
AP.2 5a.1. The System verifies that the Guest has permission registered 






Name Remove Guest 
Actors Host, Manager 
MSS 1. The Actor selects “Remove Guest” in the smart lock management website 
2. The Actor informs the Guest 
3. The Actor clicks “Remove” 
4. The System verifies that the request comes from either the Host or a Manager 
5. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is OFF 
6. The System verifies that the Guest has permission registered 
7. The System terminates the Guest permission 
AP.1 4a.1. The System verifies that the request does not come from either the Host or a 
Manager 
4a.2. The System ignores the request 
4a.3. The System informs the error 
AP.2 5a.1. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is ON 
5a.2. The System verifies that the Guest is not the exclusive permission holder 
5a.3. Go back to step 6 of the main success scenario 
AP.3 5b.1. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is ON 
5b.2. The System verifies that the Guest is the exclusive permission holder 
5b.3. The System ignores the request 
5b.4. The System informs the error 
AP.4 6a.1. The System verifies that the Guest does not have permission registered 
6a.2. The System ignores the request 



















Name Retrieve Guests 
Actors Host, Manager 
MSS 1. The Actor selects “See Guests” in the smart lock management website 
2. The System verifies that the request comes from either the Host or a Manager 
3. The System finds all Guests registered with expiry date and time set in the future 
of the request 
4. The System retrieves all Guests found in step 3 with their correspondent start 
date and time, and expiry date and time 
AP.1 2a.1. The System verifies that the request is not from either the Host or a Manager 
2a.2. The System ignores the request 
2a.3. The System informs the error 
AP.2 3a.1. The System does not find any Guests registered with expiry date and time set 
in the future of the request 
3a.2. The System informs that there are not Guests registered 
 
Reference UC5 
Name Register Manager 
Actors Host 
MSS 1. The Host selects “Register Manager” in the smart lock management website 
2. The Host informs the Manager 
3. The Host clicks “Register” 
4. The System verifies that the request comes from the Host 
5. The System verifies that the informed Manager is not registered 
6. The System registers the Manager 
AP.1 4a.1. The System verifies that the request does not come from the Host 
4a.2. The System ignores the request 
4a.3. The System informs the error 
AP.2 5a.1. The System verifies that the Manager is already registered 
5a.2. The System ignores the request 





Name Remove Manager 
Actors Host 
MSS 1. The Host selects “Remove Manager” in the smart lock management website 
2. The Host informs the Manager 
3. The Host clicks “Remove” 
4. The System verifies that the request comes from Host 
5. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is OFF 
6. The System verifies that the Manager is registered 
7. The System removes the Manager 
AP.1 4a.1. The System verifies that the request does not come from the Host 
4a.2. The System ignores the request 
4a.3. The System informs the error 
AP.2 5a.1. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is ON 
5a.2. The System verifies that the Manager is not the exclusive permission holder 
5a.3. Go back to step 6 of the main success scenario 
AP.3 5b.1. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is ON 
5b.2. The System verifies that the Manager is the exclusive permission holder 
5b.3. The System ignores the request 
5b.4. The System informs the error 
AP.4 6a.1. The System verifies that the Manager is not registered 
6a.2. The System ignores the request 
6a.3. The System informs the error 
 
Reference UC7 
Name Retrieve Managers 
Actors Host 
MSS 1. The Host selects “See Managers” in the smart lock management website 
2. The System verifies that the request comes from the Host 





Reference UC7 - Continue 
AP.1 2a.1. The System verifies that the request does not come from the Host 
2a.2. The System ignores the request 
2a.3. The System informs the error 
AP.2 3a.1. The System does not find any Managers registered 
3a.2. The System informs that there are not Managers registered 
 
Reference UC8 
Name Turn on exclusive permission 
Actors Host, Manager 
MSS 1. The Actor selects “Exclusive Permission – Switch ON” in the smart lock 
management website 
2. The Actor informs the Host, a Manager, or a Guest, and the exclusive 
permission expiry date and time 
3. The Actor clicks “Switch ON” 
4. The System verifies that the request comes from the Host 
5. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is OFF 
6. The System verifies that the desired exclusive permission holder currently has 
active permission to lock and unlock the door 
7. The System turns the exclusive permission ON 
AP.1 4a.1. The System verifies that the request comes from a Manager 
4a.2. Executes step 5 of the main success scenario 
4a.3. The System verifies that the desired exclusive permission holder is a Guest 
4a.4. Go back to step 6 of the main success scenario 
AP.2 4b.1. The System verifies that the request comes from a Manager 
4b.2. Executes step 5 of the main success scenario 
4b.3. The System verifies that the desired exclusive permission holder is either the 
Host or a Manager 
4b.4. The System ignores the request 





Reference UC8 - Continue 
AP.3 4c.1. The System verifies that the request does not come from either the Host or a 
Manager 
4c.2. The System ignores the request 
4c.3. The System informs the error 
AP.4 5a.1. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is ON 
5a.2. The System ignores the request 
5a.3. The System informs the error 
AP.5 6a.1. The System verifies that the desired exclusive permission holder currently 
does not have active permission to lock and unlock the door 
6a.2. The System ignores the request 
6a.3. The System informs the error 
 
Reference UC9 
Name Turn off exclusive permission 
Actors Host, Manager, Guest 
MSS 1. The Actor selects “Exclusive Permission – Switch OFF” in the smart lock 
management website 
2. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is ON 
3. The System verifies that the request comes from the exclusive permission 
holder 
4. The System turns the exclusive permission OFF 
AP.1 2a.1. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is OFF 
2a.2. The System ignores the request 
2a.3. The System informs the error 
AP.2 3a.1. The System verifies that the request does not come from the exclusive 
permission holder 
3a.2. The System ignores the request 








Name Check exclusive permission 
Actors Host, Manager 
MSS 1. The Actor selects “See Exclusive Permission Details” in the smart lock 
management website 
2. The System verifies that the request comes from either the Host or a Manager 
3. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is ON 
4. The System informs that the feature is active, the Actor who holds it, and its 
expiry date 
AP.1 2a.1. The System verifies that the request comes from neither Host nor a Manager 
2a.2. The System ignores the request 
2a.3. The System informs the error 
AP.2 3a.1. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is OFF 
3a.2. The System informs that the feature is OFF 
 
Reference UC11 
Name Verify permission 
Actors Guest 
MSS 1. The Guest selects “See My Permission Details” in the smart lock management 
website 
2. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is OFF 
3. The System informs the Guest permission’s start date and time, and expiry date 
and time 
AP.1 2a.1. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is ON 
2a.2. The System verifies that the Guest holds the exclusive permission feature 
2a.3. The System informs that the Guest has an exclusive permission active, along 
with its expiry date 
2a.4. The System informs the Guest permission’s start date and time, and expiry 







Reference UC11 - Continue 
AP.2 2b.1. The System verifies that the exclusive permission feature is ON 
2b.2. The System verifies that the Guest is not who holds the exclusive permission 
feature 
2b.3. Executes step 3 of the main success scenario 
AP.3 3a.1. The System does not find permission registered for the Guest 
3a.2. The System informs that the Guest is not registered 
Table 4.1 shows a matrix mapping the relationship between all the functional requirements 
and the use cases, where the code in the intersection means that the use case scenario in the column 
addresses the functional requirement in the row. Drawing this relationship is helpful for several 
reasons. First, if the matrix is constructed before detailing the use cases, it supports the development 
of its steps focused on the desired requirements to meet, and the Actors involved. Furthermore, the 
matrix helps to identify alternative paths to the main success scenario and to make sure no 
requirement is left unaddressed. Second, the matrix can be used to understand the quality of the 
use case design. For example, if a use case has intersections with too many requirements, it is either 
because they are too general, and its scope or domain is not well defined, or the requirements 
provided are overly specialized, probably being minor deviations of the same behavior, and could 
be grouped under a common goal. The inverse relationship, where a requirement has intersections 
with too many use cases, also follows that same logic. 
On the other hand, a use case that does not connect with any requirement means either that 
it is not essential in the system to achieve the desired goals, or that the requirements provided are 
somehow incomplete. Third, the matrix serves as a traceability tool. Accordingly, in the event of 
any changes being made after the design phase to any of the use cases, or requirements, it is 









Table 4.1 – Functional requirements versus use cases matrix 
 UC1 UC2 UC3 UC4 UC5 UC6 UC7 UC8 UC9 UC10 UC11 
FR1 MSS           
FR2  MSS 
AP2 
         
FR3 AP4 
AP5 
          
FR4 AP3           




        
FR6  MSS          
FR7  AP1 AP1         
FR8           MSS 
AP3 
FR9    ALL        
FR10     ALL       
FR11      ALL      
FR12       ALL     
FR13        MSS 
AP3 
AP5 
   
FR14        AP1 
AP2 
AP3 
   
FR15          ALL ALL 
FR16          ALL  
FR17        AP4    
FR18 AP1 
AP2 
          





4.2  System Architecture 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the system’s components, and a discussion about each of them is presented in the 
following pages. Please note that the architectural design goal is to discuss possibilities, concerns, 
limitations, and other aspects surrounding the components, rather than narrowing into specific 
solutions for each of them, besides the use of the Ethereum blockchain public network. The 
architectural discussion shows, however, how complex it is to design applications that leverage the 
blockchain and why it matters. In summary, it focuses on showing how it is possible to build a 
system around Ethereum, what are the implications of doing it, but the main emphasis of this thesis 
is to explore the implementation and behavior of the use cases in the blockchain. 
 
Figure 4.3 – System Architecture 
 
4.2.1 Ethereum blockchain public network 
 
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, smart locks that use centralized management 
platforms, although offering a convenient manner to remotely control the device, face some issues 
regarding user’s security and privacy. Those issues are mostly due to the full control over the 




In order to address that concern, the main component of the proposed system’s architecture 
is the Ethereum Blockchain, which has suitable characteristics to develop a decentralized 
application (DApp) to manage the door lock. Blockchain is promising to overcome that limitation 
due to its capabilities of allowing uniquely addressable users, in a peer-to-peer network, to send, 
verify, and process signed transactions while agreeing in the state of the ledger. Ethereum, while 
leveraging the blockchain general attributes, still allows users to write arbitrary rules – programs - 
and deploy them to be executed on the blockchain. Among other features, it means that the code is 
immutable, so no one can change it once it has been published. Thus, implementing all the use 
cases in Ethereum smart contracts means that Host, Managers, and Guests still have the 
convenience to control the smart lock remotely, but through a decentralized tool in which they can 
trust to execute the rules as intended – assuming they were implemented correctly in the first place 
- without the interference of unauthorized parties. It is important to emphasize that all the rules 
detailed by the use cases are executed in the blockchain, written in smart contracts, so they are fully 
decentralized. 
Ethereum can be used by joining its public network or by running a private instance of it, 
and it must be clearly stated since each one brings its advantages and disadvantages that must be 
taken into consideration at the design phase. Deciding between the two options involves a tradeoff 
between mainly security, transaction throughput, and managing the network infrastructure. The 
security aspect is directly related to the decentralization of the network. In the public environment, 
largely decentralized in terms of the number of nodes and their geographic locations, tampering 
with the data is extremely difficult. Besides the high number of malicious nodes needed to perform 
an attack, a large number of peers holding value in the network also means that many people are 
monitoring it. Private networks, slightly decentralized because they usually have only a few nodes 
participating in comparison with the public network, are generally less robust against attacks. The 
number of nodes, however, has an impact on transaction throughput and latency times. The higher 
the number of participants, the higher is the latency times, and fewer transactions can be processed. 
Finally, to run a private network, the user takes the responsibility of arranging the infrastructure 
equipment and of configuring, monitoring, and maintaining it, which requires financial resources, 
time, and technical knowledge.  
Having expressed that, the system proposed will leverage the public Ethereum network due 
to the higher security features and less network management responsibilities that it brings, 
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outweighing the lower transaction latency. Moreover, only a few use cases are compromised by 
having a latency time higher than a few seconds, namely, unlock and lock the door (UC1), retrieve 
guests (UC4), retrieve managers (UC7), check exclusive permission (UC10), and verify permission 
(UC11). However, Ethereum allows all of them to be implemented as a query to the blockchain. A 
query means that one is only retrieving information from the blockchain, not writing information 
in it – that is what a transaction does and, therefore, only transactions need to be processed by the 
network. For all other use cases, a latency limitation is consequently imposed, where the user must 
wait for the network to process their transactions. Even so, it is not believed that this limitation 
compromises the use cases in question since they are not sensitive to real-time execution. For 
example, the Host can register a guest at any point before the stay, as a start date is provided. Thus, 
even if the transaction takes more than 60 minutes, which is not usual, the functionality is not 
damaged. Of course, there could be exceptions to those use cases that would require faster 
responses from the blockchain, and Ethereum has a mechanism in place to address that need – it is 
possible to offer a higher fee price to the miners to incentivize them to process that transaction 
before others. However, it is out of the scope of this work to account for them, though advanced 
Ethereum users would still be able to take advantage of this option using the same smart contracts 
developed for this architecture, even if the smart contract is already in regular use. 
In summary, Ethereum acts as a decentralized database while also responsible for storing 
and executing the smart lock business rules – in other words, the smart contracts. Given that, note 
that Ethereum by itself does not make up for a full application but rather its back-end structure. In 
order to build that, it still requires some communication mean between the blockchain and the door 
lock device, as well as an interface where users would manage the lock functionalities. Therefore, 
it is mandatory to include other components in the architecture, considering that Ethereum neither 
provides an API endpoint to interact with it nor is it suitable to host files. Moreover, it demands a 
mechanism through which users can sign their transactions before sending them to the blockchain. 
 
4.2.2 Ethereum query gateway 
 
For the purpose of communicating with the Ethereum network, one must have access to an 
Ethereum node, i.e., a client participating in the network. Those nodes offer a remote procedure 
call (RPC) interface that enables data exchange to occur. Therefore, the first option to build this 
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bridge is by running a node and use it to interact with the blockchain. On the other hand, it demands 
infrastructure – a machine to run, internet connection, to name a few -, high technical skills to start 
and maintain the node, and introduces a single point of failure in the system – if the infrastructure 
fails, e.g., either the internet or the power at the place is down, the access to Ethereum is lost. Note, 
also, that this structure requires that the users trust who is hosting the node, acting as a central 
authority, similarly as required by the vendor of the fully centralized smart lock solution. Therefore, 
based on that premise only, it would not make sense to change the existing solution, i.e., it would 
not make sense to run an Ethereum node. Of course, it is possible to propose an architecture where 
each door lock owner would run its own Ethereum node, but the overhead of work, knowledge, 
and resources it demands, make it extremely impractical. 
Due to the high demands and constraints associated with running a node, companies started 
offering the Ethereum infrastructure as a service, where they take care of setting up and maintaining 
it, plus offering simple API options to exchange data with the blockchain. While it significantly 
lowers the barrier of entry into the network, it implicates in placing a middleman hosting an 
interface between users and the blockchain, which brings back trust and centralization concerns 
that the blockchain was set to address in the first place. For example, a malicious API could ignore 
or delay relaying any transaction to Ethereum, could interrupt the service entirely, could relay 
information to parties other or rather than the blockchain, among others. Despite that, a valid 
workaround to weaken those issues would be using multiple Ethereum API providers to form the 
Ethereum gateway component. Consequently, the trust is divided between them – the majority wins 
strategy - and this creates some redundancy to access the blockchain – if any service is interrupted, 
there are other paths available. Some API providers are Infura (2020), Nodesmith (2020), Alchemy 
(2020), and Etherscan (2020). 
As a consequence of the undesired reintroduction of a central authority in the blockchain 
application stack, while at the same time recognizing the importance of their role in abstracting the 
intensive demands of building a blockchain infrastructure, decentralized API networks projects and 
companies were developed. Since the API network itself behaves like a blockchain, similar 
characteristics are present, e.g., decentralization and trustless environment. Therefore, they do not 
break the design principle that has led to the use of Ethereum in the first place. Slock.it Incubed 
Client (2020) and Pocket Network (2020) are two available API providers of this nature. 
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Finally, note that the query word is present in the Ethereum gateway name, and the main 
reason is to constrain its scope of use in the architecture. In Ethereum, when someone wants to 
write data in the blockchain, the call is referred to as a transaction. Once they change the state of 
the chain, transactions are paid and take effect only after the network has processed them and 
confirmed their validity. On the other hand, when someone wants only to retrieve data from 
Ethereum, the call is named a query, which is free of charges and does not require network 
confirmation. The distinction in the component’s name is necessary considering that, in practice, 
this gateway is capable of handling both transactions and queries. However, in the proposed 
architecture, a different component is used to perform transactions, and the reason is elaborated 
next. 
 
4.2.3 Ethereum wallet 
 
An Ethereum wallet is a software that holds and manages the user’s accounts and their respective 
tokens. It allows users to sign transactions with their private key, and to interact with the network 
and applications built on top of it. The main advantage of including an existing wallet in the system 
architecture is because Ethereum users are already familiar with those tools, and they can choose 
the one that better fits their needs. There are a variety of wallet options available, and each of them 
addresses different requirements, e.g., desktop or mobile use, browser add-ons, hardware wallet, 
multiple token support, robust security features, among others. Generally, Ethereum wallets 
provide APIs to connect to and interact with the blockchain, not different than what was discussed 
for the Ethereum query gateway. Popular software libraries, e.g., JavaScript’s Web3.js (2020) and 
Java’s Web3j (2020), used to write software to interact with Ethereum can work with different 
providers already. 
However, the trust relationship required from the user on the wallet solution is not only 
comparable to that discussed for APIs but even worse. A malicious wallet could acquire the means 
to sign transactions of an account, so an attacker could legitimately control the account. Wallet 
providers will address this trust issue in a particular manner. For instance, some providers have 
their wallet code available open-source, while others are built entirely like that. Potentially, by 
doing so, the software gets reviewed - or developed - by a community of users, which then 
reinforces the trust on the tool. The trust concern is one more reason for the architecture to allow 
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the use of a variety of wallets, leaving users free to choose the solution which they feel comfortable 
using. In addition to that, when using not only Ethereum but any blockchain, the lesser the places 
that one must provide their account’s secret key, the better it is for their security. 
In any way, the proposed architecture does not leave those risks imposed by the wallet 
completely unaddressed. The strategy adopted is restricting the use of the wallet solely to 
submitting transactions to the blockchain, and then use the Ethereum query gateway to retrieve the 
information. Therefore, to successfully control the lock without the user’s knowledge, multiple 
pieces must be compromised. 
 
4.2.4 Lock’s management interface 
 
The management interface is the tool that allows Host, Managers, and Guests to control the lock 
functionalities, check for relevant information, and receive guidance and feedback on the actions 
performed. Note that this interface presents similar centralization and trust issues than those 
discussed for other components of this architecture, namely the Ethereum query gateway and 
wallet. Indeed, it acts as a middleman between the user and both the wallet and the gateway. 
Accordingly, it is a powerful tool once it controls not only the data flow but, more importantly, 
what the users see. For instance, a malicious management interface in the proposed architecture 
would not allow attackers to sign users’ transactions, as could happen in a compromised wallet. On 
the other hand, they could mislead them to sign tampered ones by controlling what the interface 
shows to them. Ethereum wallets will usually allow users to see the transaction’s data before they 
sign it. However, they are encoded in a low abstract level form, which is not very comprehensible 
for reading. In addition to that, depending on where one hosts the interface, attackers could drop 
its availability, prohibiting the stakeholders from managing the locks. For those reasons, the 
architecture must have mechanisms in place to diminish the trust requirements and centralization 
risks on this component. 
 An interesting approach is by leveraging blockchain-like storage platforms, i.e., distributed 
file systems, e.g., IPFS (2020) and Swarm (2020). Thus, instead of having the interface code, also 
referred to as the application’s front-end, hosted on a specific server controlled by someone, a peer-
to-peer network hosts it. Typically, a file deployed in the network is addressable by its hash string, 
which is accepted as unique and unpredictable. Consequently, if one makes any changes to that 
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particular file, it will cause a change of its hash string, which then results in a different address to 
access it in the network. Hence, note that the trust imposed on a file is limited up to the moment 
that its upload to the network occurs, which takes care of keeping it unaltered throughout time. In 
contrast, for regular central party authority hosting, even though at some point a file might have 
been trusted, changes can happen. That is why trust is continuously required. 
 Regarding the faith still demanded on the original files, making the source code publicly 
available so anyone interested can review them, as some blockchain wallets are doing, is an 
attractive option. As a result, the trust does not lie on a single actor anymore. Instead, a community 
of people and organizations anchors it. 
 Using the strategy for hosting and managing the interface source code, as detailed above, 
does not impose the use of a specific design pattern, language, or framework to build the front-end 
tool. However, it favors having a web page rather than other types of applications. First, the 
management interface runs simply by accessing the file address through a web browser. Thus, it 
does not demand users to download and run the file somewhere, which could introduce new 
concerns into the architecture. Second, a web page can be accessed by any device that supports a 
web browser and an Ethereum wallet, entirely different from building smartphone apps or computer 
installed programs, which are often platform-specific. As a result, a single solution fits a broader 
range of users without compromising the system’s use cases. 
 
4.2.5 Lock hardware 
 
The Lock hardware component is an abstraction of the physical infrastructure required to operate 
the door lock device. However, provide technical details about this piece is out of the scope of this 
thesis, which is limited to outline how the component fits in the proposed architecture, and what it 
must have to support the system’s use cases. 
 Of course, a full hardware solution development would require discussions about security, 
about alternative means to guarantee the system’s availability even without internet access or 
power supply at the place, among other needs not considered in this work. However, in the interest 
of the use cases, the discussion is surrounding two steps that the door lock must be able to complete: 




 First, regarding the communication between the user and the lock device, this architecture 
presumes that the interaction ensures that an access code can only be received from its owner. For 
example, if they are exchanging an Ethereum account address, this communication must ensure 
that the person sending the information is the actual account holder. To make it clear, assume that 
Alice holds permission to open the lock, but Bob knows about it. There should be means in place 
to avoid Bob from providing Alice’s permission at the door and successfully open it, and it must 
be at that layer. Otherwise, the blockchain will find valid permission registered. In the work of 
Zaparoli et al. (2019), introduced earlier in this thesis, they present an appealing message exchange 
protocol between a smartphone and a device that could be adapted to suit this functionality. In 
addition to that, for the user’s convenience, the lock hardware could have physical means to lock 
and unlock the door from the inside without requiring to go through the blockchain to check 
permissions. 
 The system’s architecture imposes two other requirements on the lock hardware: (i) it must 
be able to handle HTTP requests for the purpose of interacting with the Ethereum query gateway; 
(ii) it must be fully operational without the need to send transactions to the blockchain, only query 
data from it; (iii) ideally, it must ask the blockchain for a permission status every time someone 
tries to lock or unlock the door from the outside. The word ideally is because, for implementing a 
system robust against power and internet connection losses, it demands a workaround strategy on 
that requirement, at least for exceptional operation environment conditions. 
Note that the system’s architecture allows for locks to share a smart contract, being merely 
a matter of pointing to the same address. Therefore, in places where two or more devices are needed 











Designing and developing for blockchain, as noticeable from the system’s architecture discussion, 
involves many particular concerns not necessarily present when dealing with other types of 
applications. The implementation of Ethereum smart contracts also includes many specificities that 
can lead to different, unexpected, and undesired behaviors. Solidity offers multiple ways to code 
to achieve a particular outcome, not differently from many general-purpose programming 
languages. However, when dealing with Ethereum smart contracts, one must pay attention to 
aspects like cost and privacy, for instance, surrounding the development. 
 Therefore, this chapter presents the implementation process and relevant discussions about 
it. It starts with section 5.1, which details the PoC architecture to be implemented. Section 5.2 
brings the development tools used throughout the process. Then, section 5.3 details the 
implementation for each iteration. Finally, section 5.4 shows the lock’s management interface. 
 
5.1  PoC Architecture 
 
The discussion on section 4.2 focused on the generalized architecture components is hugely 
relevant to understand the available options to build the parts, how they might impact the system 
purpose, how they fit with one another, among other aspects. Section 4.2 addresses one of the 
research questions for this work about how the Ethereum blockchain can be leveraged to create a 
smart door lock solution. However, to answer the remaining research questions, defining a PoC 




Figure 5.1 – PoC Components 
Ethereum test networks are designed to emulate the Ethereum network behavior, and they 
are useful during the development and testing phases of smart contracts and decentralized 
applications. Among the reasons for their use are: (i) Ethereum test networks are free to use. They 
still charge the Ether associated with the transactions happening, but no money is required to 
acquire them there. On the other hand, Ether costs money in the public Ethereum network. 
Therefore, using test networks cut development costs; (ii) Ethereum test networks usually process 
transactions faster than the Ethereum public network. Although they emulate the Ethereum 
blockchain behavior, they use different mechanisms to process transactions, which might result in 
shorter confirmation times. Therefore, using test networks accelerates development; (iii) Ethereum 
test networks offload beta and development traffic from the Ethereum public network, which 
improves its performance; (iv) public Ethereum test networks leave its records open to anyone – 
transparency - like the main network does, allowing developers to inspect their smart contracts’ 
data flow behavior. Finally, Görli (2020) is one of the Ethereum public test networks available, and 
it is used in this architecture to emulate the public Ethereum network present in the system’s 
architecture – see section 4.2.1. 
The Ethereum query gateway discussed in section 4.2.2 is implemented in this architecture 
through the use of Infura (2020). As discussed before, using a single centralized API provider for 
the system’s architecture is not ideal. However, it works great for the context of validating the 
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architecture and running the experiments - i.e., to build the PoC. The knowledge acquired using 
only Infura applies to the Ethereum query gateway component as a whole. Therefore, it provides 
the primary gateway functionality of bridging the management interface to the blockchain through 
an API, which allows for the validation of the component in the system’s architecture. 
As explained in section 4.2.3, the choice of the Ethereum wallet is left to the user’s 
preference. Metamask (2020) is the choice of Ethereum wallet for the PoC because besides offering 
all the standard features of a wallet, it still offers a browser extension that improves the 
development experience. 
For the lock’s management interface, a web page is used in accordance with the discussion 
in section 4.2.4. The technology stack follows a standard web development stack combining 
JavaScript, HTML, and CSS, plus the use of Web3.js (2020) to interact with the wallet, which fits 
within the system’s architecture component. As explained before, the ideal solution for this part is 
hosting the tool in a distributed file system. Note, however, that the interface’s functionalities have 
the same behavior regardless of the hosting strategy. The files are the same, and the only change is 
from where they are being served. Therefore, for the purpose of architecture validation and user 
case testing of the PoC, the web page is served from a centralized host since it cuts development 
time and improves debugging capabilities. 
Finally, as stated before, the lock hardware implementation is out of the scope of this work. 
However, since the query strategy is the same that the management interface tool will perform 
through the Infura API - providing that the lock is capable of performing the HTTP calls as the 
requirement presented in section 4.2.5 -, the component architecture is also validated. 
 
5.2 Ethereum Development and Evaluation Tools 
 
First is Remix (2020), a web-based integrated development environment (IDE) that enables 
writing, testing, debugging, and deploying Ethereum smart contracts. From Remix, it is possible 
to use Metamask to deploy and interact with the smart contract in various Ethereum networks – 
e.g., the Görli test network. Also, it offers a built-in sandbox blockchain where transactions happen 
instantly, perfect for early development stages and quick testing of smart contracts. Furthermore, 
Remix enables automating tests by writing scripts to run against smart contracts. 
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Second is Etherscan (2020a, 2020b), an Ethereum block explorer, which can search and 
show all data recorded in the blockchain about the blocks, transactions, and more. Etherscan 
supports not only the main Ethereum network but also public test networks - e.g., the Görli test 
network -, which is perfect to evaluate what information is made publicly available by the 
blockchain. 
The third tool is Postman (2020), an API development tool that facilitates testing HTTP 
calls, among other functionalities. During the development phase, Postman is useful to simulate 
the calls to the smart contract coming from the lock hardware or the lock’s management interface 
- which pass through the Infura API - and investigate their behavior early in the process. 
 
5.3 Use Cases Implementation 
 
The development follows an incremental approach. It means that the use cases are gradually 
implemented, tested, and evaluated against different criteria, e.g., the information publicly 
available in the blockchain, access through Infura API, among others. If it meets the requirements 
and functionalities proposed, the development continues. On the contrary, it allows for early 
intervention, which potentially saves time and resources. This in-depth discussion is relevant to 
show the different aspects surrounding design decisions for writing smart contracts in Ethereum. 
 
5.3.1 Unlock and lock the door - Host  
 
The most basic functionality that works as the backbone structure for the application is the Host 
locking and unlocking the door – see UC1 in section 4.1. Therefore, it is a great place to start. The 
smart contract of Figure 5.2 shows the implementation of this functionality. It is essential to 
highlight some aspects of the smart contract: 
• It is set to work with the latest full developed version of the Solidity language, v0.5; 
• The address variable type refers to an Ethereum account public key; 
• The internal keyword imposes that only the smart contract itself, or contracts derived from 
it, can read and modify the host variable; 
• The constructor is called only once in the smart contract life cycle, only when it is deployed; 
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• The msg.sender value refers to the address of the account that makes the call to the smart 
contract. Therefore, the constructor sets as host the Ethereum address that deploys the smart 
contract; 
• The view modifier on the unlock function means that it does not make changes to state 
variables, only read them. A call to this function, then, is free and does not require 
processing from the blockchain – also known as a query; 
• The unlock function is meant to be called by both the lock device and the management tool, 
which then informs the address to be verified. Note that anyone can call it for any address 
and check its unlock ability. Although it enables anyone to potentially find addresses that 
can unlock the door, if the lock hardware follows the requirement detailed in section 4.2.5, 
it should not be an issue there. Also, it is not an issue for the management tool since the 
secret key would also be required to change anything in the contract. 
 
Figure 5.2 – Smart Contract - Host unlock the door 
Along with the smart contract, following a good programming practice, a test script to run 
in Remix is also developed. It automates the contract tests to ensure that past implemented 
functionalities still behave as expected, regardless of the current development, while saving the 
time that would be spent by manually testing the contract every once in a while. 
As explained earlier, Metamask can be used with Remix to deploy and interact with smart 
contracts in many Ethereum networks, and Görli is one of them. The deployment of the contract 
above happens to enable the evaluation of the public information available about it, and how it 
behaves when called through the Infura API. 
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The smart contract is deployed in the Görli network with the address 
0xbA1dC49D71883c8475Bb3eC16751D1683AB37FC5. Anyone can see the details about it by 
using the Etherscan website to inspect the blockchain. Figure 5.3 shows the information available 
about the contract, while Figure 5.4 brings what is available about the transaction that originated 
it. At this point, no other interaction happened with the contract besides its creation. 
 
Figure 5.3 – Contract’s publicly available data 
First, it is worth highlighting that to have access to those pages shown, at this point, one 
must know either the transaction hash that originated the contract, the contract address, or the 
Host’s account address. At this stage, though, no one else besides the Host has reasons to hold that 
knowledge, which would make the contract hard to find. On the other hand, by the time the contract 
is completely written and in use, all those required information can be found or inferred by a variety 
of means, since all stakeholders interact with it. In conclusion, all the evaluations through Etherscan 
in this work assumes that any interested party can have access to it. Furthermore, remember that 
the stakeholders must know their real identities to make the arrangements of a stay. Consequently, 
the pseudo-anonymity provided by the Ethereum address is compromised. Even if the 
implementation design were to separate the functionalities in different contracts by stakeholder, 
eventually, they would require exchanging data between themselves, and it would be equally 
recorded in the blockchain. 
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Going back to the data available, the most important information one can learn is the Host’s 
address. In Ethereum, however, no one will be able to use it to interact with the smart contract since 
the private key – secret key - is also required for that. For that reason, it represents no risk to the 
application. At this point, that is all to inspect, once the only function available to call is unlock, 
which is called as a query and, therefore, does not leave any records in the blockchain. 
 
Figure 5.4 – Contract’s deploy transaction - Publicly available data 
Finally, the last aspect of evaluating this contract is how it behaves when called from the 
Infura API. Ideally, the calls to Infura would come from either the lock hardware or the 
management tool. However, as discussed before, they both communicate with Infura in the same 
way, through HTTP requests. To test and evaluate the architecture with those HTTP calls during 
development, applying less effort than building the management interface along with the smart 
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contract would require, Postman is used. As a result, the management tool implementation can be 
postponed and safely start after the smart contract is fully developed. 
Figure 5.5 shows a request from Postman to the Infura API endpoint. It asks Infura to call 
the unlock function of the smart contract deployed on the Görli network, using the Host address as 
a parameter. The image also shows the response from Infura, where the result field means that the 
unlock function returned true – the address can unlock the door. It is worth highlighting the 
following: 
• The parameter from corresponds to which account is making the call. In this case, a random 
account address is used since anyone can call the function; 
• The parameter to is which address to call. I.e., the smart contract address at the Görli 
network; 
• The parameter data is encoded with the smart contract function to be called and the 
corresponding parameters – if any. The encoded message can be obtained in Remix. By 
visually inspecting the call, though, it is possible to identify the Host address – that is the 
function expected parameter. 
 
Figure 5.5 – Infura API request and response to the contract unlock function 
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To continue the development is extremely important to bear in mind that to make a query 
call to the smart contract does not require signing the message with the account’s secret key. In 
other words, anyone can use that address to query the function. That is not the case for transactions, 
however. No one can submit a transaction without signing it with the account’s private key. Of 
course, this function could be written to require a transaction call, but that would bring two issues 
to the architecture. First, transactions are paid, meaning that the lock hardware and the management 
interface would have to pay every time that information was needed, which appears to be 
unreasonable. Second, the network must process those transactions, which can take a while. It does 
not seem reasonable to impose this wait at someone that is at the door waiting to get in. 
In conclusion, it is better to work with the query constraint in mind than paying and waiting 
for transactions. 
 
5.3.2 Add support for Guests 
 
Once Managers are fundamentally a special case of the Host, more precisely a constrained one, it 
makes sense to implement first all the use cases considering only the existence of Host and Guests. 
For that reason, the next increment builds the necessary functionalities to begin supporting Guests. 
More specifically, they correspond to the use cases: (i) UC2 – Register Guest; (ii) UC3 – Remove 
Guest; (iii) UC4 - Retrieve Guests; (iv) UC11 – Verify Permission; (v) UC1 – Unlock and lock the 
door.  
Similar to section 5.3.1, following are some significant highlights about the smart contract 
implementation partially shown by Figure 5.6: 
• The smart contract requires the Ethereum account address of anyone to be registered as a 
Guest. It demands, therefore, that Host and Guest exchange that information outside the 
application, e.g., through Airbnb after booking the place; 
• The functions registerGuest() and removeGuest() alter the data in the smart contract, which 
means they require a transaction to be called. The modifier onlyOwner included at the 
functions’ declaration enforces that, in order to call them, one must be the registered owner 
of the smart contract. If anyone else tries to use them, none of the code insides is executed. 
Furthermore, the Guest is only added, or removed, after the blockchain process the 
transaction, as explained before; 
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• In Solidity, dates are represented in the Unix Epoch time (Wikipedia, 2020), which is the 
number of seconds that have elapsed since 00:00:00 UTC of 1 January 1970. For instance, 
the Unix Epoch time for 09:30:00 GMT of 30 January 2020 is 1580376600; 
• In solidity, the most efficient data type to record relationships between entities is a mapping, 
which works similarly as a key-value dictionary. However, unlike dictionaries of popular 
object-oriented languages, Solidity’s mapping does not allow iteration through its keys. In 
other words, one must know the key to access its corresponding value. Therefore, a second 
data type, an array, is demanded to allow for Guests retrieval, i.e., keep track of the mapping 
keys; 
• The function retrieveGuests() returns the addresses of all Guests registered in the mapping. 
Once smart contract functions do not return structs – the data structure used to record 
Guests’ permission dates -, the management interface must call guestPermissionDetails() 
for each Guest address retrieved to meet the UC4 scenario correctly. Furthermore, 
retrieveGuests() includes past Guests with expired permissions. Again, to meet the UC4 
scenario, the management interface must use the permission details to hide past Guests from 
the user. 
The UC4 specifies in the second step of the main success scenario that the system verifies 
that the retrieve request comes from either the Host or a Manager and, if that is not the case, the 
system should ignore the request, i.e., not respond. However, as shown in the previous section 
5.3.1, query calls to smart contract functions - as it is the case for retireveGuests() – do not require 
signing the message with the accounts' private key. In other terms, anyone could make a query call 
defining which address it should be made from. Nevertheless, the transactions to register Guests 
are open in the blockchain with the permission details –more details are following -, and any 
interested party could derive a Guest list from the smart contract calls. In any case, both 
retireveGuests() and guestPermissionDetails() functions have the modifier that constraints who 
can call them for two reasons: (i) to avoid casual users of retrieving the Guest list and acquiring 
other Guests’ permission details through the management interface – which is assumed to be honest 
and do not allow calls from accounts not owned by the person; (ii) to make it more complex to 
acquire that information. As discussed before regarding the host address, the fact that Guest 
addresses and their permission details are public, it does not represent a significant threat due to 





Figure 5.6 – Smart Contract Snippet – some Guests related functionalities 
The following experiment is executed - at the given order - to illustrate the query call issue 
better: 
• Using Remix and Metamask, the smart contract is deployed in the Görli network at the 




• The Host account registers the address 
0x3d1b95E8Dff394bfD428ae1aCA99C3681B2d5263 as Guest, with start date as 
1580376600 and expiry date as 2590376699; 
• Using Postman to call the Infura API, a request is made to the function retrieveGuests() 
using a random address – which simulates the honest call made from the management 
interface. The request and the response can be found in Figure 5.7, which resulted in a failed 
call as expected; 
• The last step was repeated but using the Host address. The request and the response can be 
found in Figure 5.8, which resulted in a successful call containing the registered Guest’s 
address; 
 





Figure 5.8 – Infura API request and response to retrieveGuests function – call from Host 
account 
Next, the Host account removes the Guest previously added. The reason is to investigate 
the publicly available information related to registering and removing a Guest. Once again, 
Etherscan is used to inspect the smart contract address, which displays all the transactions in 
chronological order. Figure 5.9 shows the transaction details of registering a Guest. Note that the 
input data field has four hexadecimal numbers encoded between zeros, and it contains all the 
permission information as following: 
• 0x65d63832: This number encodes the function to call - in this case, registerGuest. Each 
function in the smart contract has its identifier, that can be easily obtained from different 
sources. Remix, for instance, is one of them; 
• 3d1b95e8dff394bfd428ae1aca99c3681b2d5263: The Guest address; 
• 5e32a218: Hexadecimal representation of number 1580376600; 




Figure 5.9 – Publicly available transaction details to register a Guest 
The transaction details of removing a Guest are in Figure 5.10. Observe that the input data 
field reveals the removeGuest function call, encoded as 0x5256bfe7, for the Guest 
3d1b95e8dff394bfd428ae1aca99c3681b2d5263, analogously to what happened for registerGuest. 
In conclusion, all data sent to the smart contract is open to the public. Although not ideal, 
the knowledge of the Host, Guests, and eventually Managers accounts does not allow unauthorized 
manipulations as, for example, register and remove Guests or unlocking the door – assuming that 
the lock hardware follows the architecture guidelines. The knowledge obtained from the 
transactions also does not enable people to monitor or infer if someone is currently at the place or 
not. The query calls to verify permissions from the lock hardware are not recorded in the blockchain 
and, even if someone knows that there is no Guest registered at a given time, Host and Managers 




Figure 5.10 – Publicly available transaction details to remove a Guest 
 
5.3.3 Exclusive permission feature 
 
The next increment builds the exclusive permission feature. More specifically, it covers the use 
cases that follow: (i) UC8 – Turn on exclusive permission; (ii) UC9 – Turn off exclusive 
permission; (iii) UC10 – Check exclusive permission. However, this feature also has an impact on 
many other use cases, as described by their main success scenarios and alternative paths. Therefore, 
reviewing the following use cases, partially implemented before, is necessary: (i) UC1 – Unlock 
and lock the door; (ii) UC3 – Remove Guest; (iii) UC11 – Verify Permission. 
As the implementation leverages the same structure and elements used for coding the 
previous versions, it is not necessary to discuss the functions in depth. However, it is worth 
mentioning a new approach used to enforce functions’ preconditions. Figure 5.6 shows the 
removeGuest function starting with an if condition to check if the Guest is registered. Otherwise, it 
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does not make sense to remove it. However, in those cases where the Guest was not registered, the 
Host would still be able to make a successful call to the function, useless but successful. The danger 
is that a typo could give the Host the wrong impression that the Guest's permission was removed 
when, in fact, it was still there. This behavior was changed using the require function, which forces 
a transaction to fail if its condition evaluates to false. Going back to the Guest remove example, if 
the Host tries to remove an inexistent Guest, the transaction will fail, and they will know that 
something went wrong. The Metamask wallet can inform users that the transaction at hand is likely 
going to fail even before they approve and send it. As an example, Figure 5.11 displays the warning 
gave by Metamask when the Host tries to call the removeGuest function to remove an inexistent 
address. Assumes that the Host ignores this warning, sends the transaction, and it fails. Using 
Etherscan to inspect the transaction reveals the custom message written in the require function that 
explains the error, which in this case is “The Guest is not registered” – see Figure 5.12. 
 
Figure 5.11 – Metamask warning before sending a transaction that does not meet an expected 
precondition 
Figure 5.13 presents three functions using this strategy to enforce pre-conditions - e.g., 
turnExclusiveFeatureOn() will reject a transaction if the feature is already on. 
One more relevant characteristic to emphasize is that details about the exclusive permission 
feature – the address that holds the permission and when it expires – are available in the blockchain. 
As demonstrated before, although the functions responsible for retrieving the information only 
answer calls from the host address, advanced users can emulate that call, e.g., using Infura API, or 
find the information using block explorers to find and view transactions details. Despite that, this 





Figure 5.12 – Host removes inexistent Guest - Failed transaction details 
 
5.3.4 Add support for Managers 
 
The next increment includes support for Managers, which represent a Host with some functionality 
constraints. Therefore, it implements the following use cases: (i) UC5 – Register Manager; (ii) 
UC6 – Remove Manager; (iii) UC7 – Retrieve Managers. In addition to that, all the use cases that 
contain the Manager as one of the actors must be revisited. In other words, all the use cases besides 





Figure 5.13 – Smart contract functions using require() to enforce preconditions 
 The implementation of Managers follows precisely the same data structure strategy used 
for Guests, which is a combination of a mapping variable with an array of Manager addresses. As 
a consequence of that, the operations of registering, removing, and retrieving Managers are highly 
similar to those of Guests, which implicates that all the discussions in section 5.3.2 - Add support 
for Guests – related to those actions are equally applicable for Managers. For instance, inspecting 
the blockchain record of transactions reveals Manager addresses registered as it does for Guests. 
Also, it is possible to successfully call the function to retrieve the list of Managers without the need 
to sign the request, as shown for Guests previously. 
Besides the introduction of the data structure and of those operations to control Managers, 
use cases already implemented must accommodate the newly introduced actor. Note from the use 
cases, however, that when they allow both Manager and Host to act, they expect an identical 
behavior from both actors – there is a single exception to that, UC8 Turn on exclusive permission. 
It means that most of the changes necessary to support Managers are simply changing the 
functions’ custom access modifier from onlyOwner to the new eitherOwnerOrManager - see 
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Figure 5.14. Regarding UC8, where the Manager has a limitation in functionality compared to the 
Host, the modification besides changing the modifier was checking for whom the Manager tries to 
turn the feature on – compare Figure 5.15 with Figure 5.13 to see the difference. As a result of 
those minimal changes, the discussion presented in previous sections of this chapter remain valid 
and can be applied to Managers. 
 
Figure 5.14 – onlyOwner and eitherOwnerOrManager access modifiers implementation 
 
Figure 5.15 – turnExclusiveFeatureOn function implementation 
 
5.3.5 Add events 
 
At this stage, the smart contract implements all the use cases proposed. However, it works as a 
single way of communication. For instance, when the management tool wants to interact with the 
smart contract to retrieve information or send transactions, it reaches the smart contract with the 
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desired action. The smart contract, on the other hand, does not have the means to reach external 
components and update them on some changes that have happened. For example, say that Bob, a 
Guest holding the exclusive permission feature, decides to turn off its exclusive access. This 
modification is relevant to Alice, the Host, but unless she checks the exclusive feature status with 
the smart contract every other time, she would not know about it. A second illustration for this 
behavior has Alice, the Host, registering a new Guest through the management interface. She 
approves the transaction in her wallet, and a few moments later, she receives the confirmation of 
the transaction’s successful execution. For Alice to check if the Guest was registered correctly, she 
would need to manually ask for it, which works but is not user-friendly. If a change in the Guests’ 
list could be notified to the management tool, it could automatically fetch the updated information. 
Fortunately, Ethereum offers smart contract events to address this concern. 
 Ethereum events work as a publish-subscribe design pattern. Custom events are declared 
inside the smart contract and are published – emitted - when some desired condition is met – e.g., 
when a function executes. External clients can subscribe to listen to particular events of specific 
contracts. As a consequence, any external stakeholder can be notified by the smart contract when 
something of their interest happens. Events can include tailored data, but it is crucial to understand 
that, similarly to what happens with transactions, they are kept open in the blockchain to anyone 
to see. In other words, there is not a mechanism to protect who can subscribe to a particular event. 
Another significant characteristic of events is that only transactions can emit them since they have 
a cost. Free query calls to functions that retrieve information cannot use events - e.g., get the 
Guests’ list. 
 In summary, while events are convenient to enhance the user experience and the 
applications using Ethereum smart contracts, it brings limitations in terms of privacy and costs. For 
those reasons, the system’s smart contract implements only three events, and none of them 
publishes additional information. Those events are: 
• GuestChange: Emitted every time a Guest is registered or removed; 
• ManagerChange: Emitted every time a Manager is registered or removed; 
• ExclusiveFeatureChange: Emitted every time the exclusive permission feature is either 
turned on or off. 
Going back to the lock’s management interface example, now it can subscribe to those 
events and retrieve the related data automatically when they happen, they do not require any action 
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from the user. It provides the desired functionality without exposing too much information about 
the smart lock management. 
Using Etherscan, it is possible to see the events emitted by a particular transaction. Figure 
5.16 shows the event log for the register Guest transaction 
0xaff6204d9c13e06b3f23fe2d586a992f368b2d8143b66c0f8ee57dc274f42cb8. As usual, the topic 
is encoded but corresponds to the GuestChange event. Note that this topic matches the one shown 
by the event log in Figure 5.17, which corresponds to the remove Guest transaction 
0xa2eb4ff8b541e6b89a10dd083847e4de11c6cfcab0ac2d13050bb3e5bac93fb5. Also, observe that 
both events have the data field empty. 
Finally, the smart contract implementation is complete and Figure 5.18 shows the contract’s 
UML class diagram representation. 
 




Figure 5.17 – Event log for a remove guest transaction  
 
Figure 5.18 – Smart contract’s UML class diagram 
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5.4 Lock’s Management Interface 
 
As discussed in section 5.1, this interface is built using JavaScript, HTML, CSS, and Web3.js 
(2020). This tool allows Host, Managers, and Guests to execute all the actions as described by each 
of the eleven use cases. For instance, Figure 5.19 shows the interface to register a Guest. Note in 
the figure that the title brings a clock icon, which communicates to the user that the action – a 
transaction to the blockchain – might take some time to complete. 
 
Figure 5.19 – Management Interface: Register Guest 
 The PoC version of the management interface shows all the functions regardless of the 
Actor type – Host, Managers, and Guests – even though only the Host can use all of them. The 
main reason for implementing the tool like that is to be able to test all the use cases properly, which 
includes Actors trying to execute actions that they are not allowed to do and that the system should 
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handle at the smart contract level, as discussed before. Figure 5.20 illustrates a scenario where the 
Guest tries to retrieve the list of Managers, which they are not allowed to access. 
 
Figure 5.20 – Management Interface: Guest retrieve Managers list 
 The management interface includes two functionalities not specified by the use cases 
because they are related to the use of Ethereum smart contracts. First, the interface provides an 
option to deploy a new smart contract in the blockchain. Second, it enables users to inform the 
address of an existing contract. It is only after completion of one of those two options that the 
interface is set for use. Observe that users must keep their smart contract addresses saved 
somewhere once the management interface does not store any data. In addition to that, Hosts must 









EXPERIMENTS  AND EVALUATIONS 
 
Transactions on Ethereum are not free and, therefore, the system requires Host, Managers, and 
Guests, to spend money to manage the lock. Hence, it is critical to evaluate the system for operating 
costs. In addition to that, all the use cases must be systematically assessed to ensure that the system 
displays behaviors that match the description of the scenarios. Moreover, there is the necessity to 
measure the latency times encountered to manage the lock that is imposed by the Ethereum 
network. As a result, it is then possible to understand the impact that the blockchain has on the 
overall system, and what kind of limitation it imposes, if any. This chapter first presents the 
methodology developed for each experiment in section 6.1, followed by the results and their 




Initially, it is fundamental to observe that all the evaluations presented in this section are connected 
to the eleven use cases developed earlier in chapter four. Sets of those test cases were selected to 
validate the system functionalities, measure its performance, as well as evaluate its running costs.  
 This section is organized as follows: 6.1.1 is the test case details; 6.1.2 presents the 
methodology for three experiments designed to evaluate performance; and 6.1.3 details the 
methodology for three experiments designed to evaluate the cost. Table 6.1 shows how those six 
experiments are related to the research objectives presented in chapter two. 
Table 6.1 – Relationship between the experiments and the research objectives from chapter two 
Research Objective Experiments 
2.a – Verify functionalities 6.1.2.1 
2.b – Evaluate delay 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, and 6.1.2.3 




6.1.1 Test cases 
 
Since all use cases already show systematically detailed descriptions for their functionalities, they 
can be treated as test cases. Every use case has a main success scenario and some alternative paths, 
where each of them represents a test case for that functionality. Test cases are referred to by the 
use case number plus either the letters “MSS,” for the main success scenario, or the letters “AP” 
followed by a number, for the individual alternative path. For instance, the test case UC1.AP3 
represents the unlock and lock the door use case executed through the alternative path 3, and 
UC1.MSS refers to its main success scenario. Moreover, multiple executions of a single test case 
might happen in some evaluations– e.g., a Host registering several Guests. The test case sets 
defined for each experiment will be described in the according section. 
 Besides the test cases extracted from the use cases, the system requires one further test. In 
order to set up the system, the smart contract must be deployed in the Ethereum blockchain, which 
adds costs and performance considerations to the system. This test case is called “Deploy.” 
 Although the use cases are described systematically in terms of functionality, they lack 
relevant information about their corresponding implementation. For instance, the test cases must 
carefully describe where they initiate the action, what are the components and Actors involved, 
which smart contract functions are called, among others. To address those matters, figures 6.1 to 
6.21 are UML sequence diagrams that illustrates the use cases flow.  
The sequence diagrams make some assumptions: 
• The Actor is logged in to the Metamask wallet; 
• The smart contract is deployed in the blockchain – except for the Deploy use case 
of Figure 6.21; 
• The lock’s interface management tool is set with both the smart contract address 
and the Actor’s Ethereum account address; 
• The Actor always sends the transaction to the smart contract, even in those cases 
where they get a warning saying that a transaction might fail; 
• Metamask obtains the transaction confirmation from the blockchain. How this 
process happens internally in Metamask, however, is not relevant to the diagrams. 
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Once the implementation of the lock’s hardware is out of the scope of this work, the test 
case for UC1 emulates the hardware call through the lock’s management interface – as explained 
in section 5.1. 
 
Figure 6.1 – UC1 sequence diagram – Unlock and lock the door 
 
Figure 6.2 – UC2.MSS, AP2 sequence diagram – Register Guest 
 




Figure 6.4 – UC3.MSS, AP2 sequence diagram – Remove Guest 
 
Figure 6.5 – UC3.AP1, AP3, AP4 sequence diagram – Remove Guest 
 




Figure 6.7 – UC4.AP1 sequence diagram – Retrieve Guests 
 
Figure 6.8 – UC5.MSS sequence diagram – Register Manager 
 




Figure 6.10 – UC6.MSS, AP2 sequence diagram – Remove Manager 
 
Figure 6.11 – UC6.AP1, AP3, AP4 sequence diagram – Remove Manager 
 




Figure 6.13 – UC7.AP1 sequence diagram – Retrieve Managers 
 
Figure 6.14 – UC8.MSS, AP1 sequence diagram – Turn on exclusive permission 
 




Figure 6.16 – UC9.MSS sequence diagram – Turn off exclusive permission 
 
Figure 6.17 – UC9.AP1, AP2 sequence diagram – Turn off exclusive permission 
 




Figure 6.19 – UC10.AP1 sequence diagram – Check exclusive permission 
 
Figure 6.20 – UC11 sequence diagram – Verify permission 
 
Figure 6.21 – Deploy sequence diagram 
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6.1.2 Evaluating performance 
 
Although the Ethereum test network Görli is an excellent choice to emulate the Ethereum 
blockchain functional behavior, it is not suitable to evaluate performance metrics and extrapolate 
the findings to the Ethereum main network – also referred to as mainnet. For this work, 
performance is measured by how long the blockchain takes to process a transaction and to reply to 
a query call. This time is referred to as transaction latency, and it might vary according to a diverse 
set of factors, e.g., by the number of transactions at a given time. The Gas price offered by users 
also has an impact on that considering that, the higher the value, the more attractive it is to miners 
to process the transaction and collect the fee. This may lead to lower latency times in comparison 
to other transactions since the Ethereum network does not impose an order that the transactions 
must be processed, i.e., the miners are free to choose among them. Therefore, there is not a direct 
relationship between the performance of Ethereum test networks and the mainnet. In short, in order 
to properly evaluate the system’s performance, the smart contract must be deployed in the 
production environment, the main Ethereum network. 
In total, this thesis proposes three experiments to measure performance: (i) a base case; (ii) 
a network dynamics case; (iii) a Gas price case. The three of them enable a discussion about what 
the use cases latency are, how they can be affected by the network dynamics, and how they can be 
manipulated by the Gas price setting. The next sections detail each one of these experiments. 
 
6.1.2.1 The base case experiment 
 
This experiment follows the methodology presented below: 
1. Define a methodical set of test cases chronologically arranged – see Table 6.2; 
2. Define a fixed set of Ethereum accounts and the actors they correspond to – see Table 
6.3; 
3. Define a fixed Gas price to be offered by every transaction; 
4. Execute the test cases in the mainnet, using a single Metamask wallet account and the 
same browser; 
4.1 Record the transaction number – if applicable; 
4.2 Record the smart contract address; 
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4.3 Record if the behavior matches the expectation; 
4.4 For transactions:  
• Record both the submission and confirmation times obtained from the 
Metamask wallet log; 
4.5 For queries – calls to the smart contract’s view functions: 
• Record the submission time obtained from the management interface tool; 
• Record the response time obtained from the management interface tool; 
4.6 Calculate and record the latency as the response time minus the submission time. 
To address the third step of the methodology, the definition of the Gas price, Ethereum Gas 
Station website (2020) is used. This website monitors Gas prices in the network and provides real-
time recommendations of prices based on the expected confirmation time for a transaction. It offers 
three price recommendations: (i) the ”Safe Low” price represents an expected confirmation time 
up to 30 minutes; (ii) the “Standard” price, up to 5 minutes; (iii) the “Fast” price, up to 2 minutes. 
Those prices regularly change according to the network usage. For this experiment, the “Fast” 
recommended price when starting the experiment execution must be taken as the fixed value for 
step three. In other words, immediately before starting the execution of this experiment, the “Fast” 
price recommended by the Ethereum Gas Station at that moment must be used by all the 
transactions defined by step two. Even if the recommended price changes during the experiment, 
the Gas price offered should not change. 
The Actor “Guest Past” represents a past Guest of the Host, meaning that the person has 
had permission at some point to open the lock, but now it has expired. In practice, to simulate that 
scenario, that Guest is registered with an expired permission date - start and expiry date set 
anywhere in the past. Similarly, the “Guest Future” represents a Guest who will stay at the place at 
some point. Therefore, it is a Guest that is registered with both start and expiry permission dates 
set anywhere in the future. 
Table 6.2 – Set of tests for the performance base case experiment 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
T1 Smart contract deploy Deploy 
 
Host 
T2 Host can open the lock UC1.MSS Host Host 
T3 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 1 Host 
T4 Manager can open the lock UC1.MSS Manager 1 Manager 1 
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Table 6.2 Continue 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
T5 Host tries to add existing Manager UC5.AP2 Manager 1 Host 
T6 Manager tries to add a new Manager UC5.AP1 Manager 2 Manager 1 
T7 Unknown tries to add new Manager UC5.AP1 Manager 2 Unknown 
T8 Host adds new Guest UC2.MSS Guest 1, 1583049600, 
1591027200 
Host 




T10 Guest can open the lock UC1.AP3 Guest 1 Guest 1 
T11 Guest verifies its permission details UC11.MSS 
 
Guest 1 
T12 Future Guest tries to open the lock UC1.AP4 Guest Future Guest 
Future 











T15 Guest tries to add a new Manager UC5.AP1 Manager 2 Guest 1 
T16 Guest tries to add Guest UC2.AP1 Guest 1, 1583049600, 
1592027220 
Guest 1 
T17 Unknown tries to add Guest UC2.AP1 Guest 1, 1583049600, 
1592027220 
Unknown 
T18 Host adds existing Guest UC2.AP2 Guest 1, 1583049600, 
1593027240 
Host 
T19 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 2 Host 




T21 Past Guest tries to open the lock UC1.AP5 Guest Past Guest Past 
T22 Host retrieves Guests UC4.MSS 
 
Host 
T23 Manager retrieves Guests UC4.MSS 
 
Manager 2 
T24 Guest tries to retrieve Guests UC4.AP1 
 
Guest 1 
T25 Unknown tries to retrieve Guests UC4.AP1 
 
Unknown 
T26 Host retrieves Managers UC7.MSS 
 
Host 
T27 Manager tries to retrieve Managers UC7.AP1 
 
Manager 1 




T29 Unknown tries to retrieve Managers UC7.AP1 
 
Unknown 
T30 Host turns exclusive on to self UC8.MSS Host, 1591027200 Host 
T31 Manager checks exclusive details UC10.MSS 
 
Manager 1 
T32 Host exclusive ca 
n open the lock 
UC1.AP1 Host Host 
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Table 6.2 Continue 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
T33 Manager tries to open the lock when 
exclusive is on to other 
UC1.AP2 Manager 1 Manager 1 
T34 Host exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Host 





T36 Manager tries to turn exclusive on to 
self 
UC8.AP2 Manager 1, 
1591027200 
Manager 1 
T37 Host turns exclusive on to Manager UC8.AP2 Manager 1, 
1591027200 
Host 
T38 Host checks exclusive details UC10.MSS 
 
Host 










T41 Manager exclusive can open the 
lock 
UC1.AP1 Manager 1 Manager 1 
T42 Host tries to remove Manager that 
holds exclusive permission 
UC6.AP3 Manager 1 Host 
T43 Host adds new Manager while 
exclusive is on 
UC5.MSS Manager 3 Host 
T44 Host removes Manager while 
exclusive is on to another Manager 
UC6.AP2 Manager 3 Host 
T45 Guest verifies its permission details 




T46 Host tries to open the lock when 
exclusive is on to other 
UC1.AP2 Host Host 
T47 Guest tries to open the lock when 
exclusive is on to other 
UC1.AP2 Guest 1 Guest 1 
T48 Host tries to turn exclusive off when 




T49 Manager exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Manager 1 





T51 Guest tries to turn exclusive on to 
self 
UC8.AP3 Guest 1, 1591027200 Guest 1 
T52 Unknown tries to turn exclusive on 
to Guest 
UC8.AP3 Guest 1, 1591027200 Unknown 
T53 Manager turns exclusive on to Guest UC8.AP1 Guest 1, 1591027200 Manager 1 
T54 Host tries to remove Guest that 
holds exclusive permission 
UC3.AP3 Guest 1 Host 
T55 Host removes Guest while exclusive 
is on to another Guest 
UC3.AP2 Guest Past Host 
T56 Guest exclusive can open the lock UC1.AP1 Guest 1 Guest 1 
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Table 6.2 Continue 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
T57 Host tries to open the lock when 
exclusive is on to other 
UC1.AP2 Host Host 
T58 Host tries to turn exclusive on to 
Guest when already on 
UC8.AP4 Guest 1, 1591037220 Host 





T60 Guest exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Guest 1 
T61 Host tries to turn exclusive on to 
Future Guest 
UC8.AP5 Guest Future, 
1591037220 
Host 





T63 Guest tries to remove Guest UC3.AP1 Guest Future Guest 1 
T64 Unknown tries to remove Guest UC3.AP1 Guest Future Unknown 
T65 Manager removes Guest UC3.MSS Guest Future Manager 2 
T66 Host tries to remove a not existing 
Guest 
UC3.AP4 Unknown Host 
T67 Guest tries to remove Manager UC6.AP1 Manager 2 Guest 1 
T68 Host removes Guest UC3.MSS Guest 1 Host 





T70 Manager tries to remove Manager UC6.AP1 Manager 2 Manager 1 
T71 Unknown tries to remove Manager UC6.AP1 Manager 1 Unknown 
T72 Host tries to remove a not existing 
Manager 
UC6.AP4 Unknown Host 
T73 Host removes Manager UC6.MSS Manager 1 Host 
T74 Host removes Manager UC6.MSS Manager 2 Host 





Table 6.3 – Ethereum accounts for the performance base case experiment 
Actor Account address 
Host 0xcA18f8947783a38A61a710752673B3f5d0159F6F 
Manager 1 0x470b57384Be9C15C9416958D8D35027a0b2a9f30 
Manager 2 0x71330E718D52b82506c14A18bE625C585F194b01 
Guest 1 0xc2596913A7283C727DF156f8F3a359c68559bBb2 
Guest Past 0xDb0Dd99ffd184DcC1aD7C908a485E89A3a054935 




6.1.2.2 The network dynamics experiment 
 
Performance experiment two is set to evaluate how different Ethereum network conditions can 
impact the latency time. It is crucial to note that the proposed methodology assumes that a different 
day of the week and time of the day manifest distinct network dynamics. Ideally, those transactions 
happening on a later day should occur precisely at the same time as the previous day. However, 
since the transaction confirmation time varies unpredictably, and the test cases are sequential, the 
methodology sets only a start time. Then, the subsequent tests are continuously executed as early 
as the previous transactions are confirmed. The detailed methodology is: 
1. Define a methodical and chronologically arranged subset of transactions from the base 
case experiment – see Table 6.4, which uses the same Ethereum accounts from Table 
6.3; 
2. Use the same Gas price offered in the base case experiment; 
3. Execute the set of test cases: 
▪ Starting at nine AM on a Thursday; 
▪ Starting at six PM on the same Thursday; 
▪ Starting at nine AM on the following Sunday; 
▪ Starting at six PM on the same Sunday; 
4. Execute the test cases in the mainnet, using the same Metamask wallet account and the 
same browser of the base case experiment; 
4.1 Execute the following test case as soon as the previous one is confirmed by the 
network; 
4.2 Record the transaction number; 
4.3 Record the smart contract address; 
4.4 Record both the submission and confirmation times obtained from the Metamask 
wallet log; 
Table 6.4 – Set of tests for the network dynamics experiment 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
T1 Smart contract deploy Deploy 
 
Host 
T3 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 1 Host 





Table 6.4 Continue 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 




T19 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 2 Host 
T30 Host turns exclusive on to self UC8.MSS Host, 1591027200 Host 
T34 Host exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS  Host 
T37 Host turns exclusive on to 
Manager 
UC8.AP2 Manager 1, 1591027200 Host 
T49 Manager exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Manager 1 
T53 Manager turns exclusive on to 
Guest 
UC8.AP1 Guest 1, 1591027200 Manager 1 
T60 Guest exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Guest 1 
T65 Manager removes Guest UC3.MSS Guest Future Manager 2 
T68 Host removes Guest UC3.MSS Guest 1 Host 
T73 Host removes Manager UC6.MSS Manager 1 Host 
T74 Host removes Manager UC6.MSS Manager 2 Host 
 
6.1.2.3 The Gas price experiment 
 
Performance experiment three is set to investigate the impact of Gas price on the transaction 
confirmation time, where three distinct values are offered. Due to the networking dynamics, 
ideally, transactions having different Gas prices must be submitted simultaneously. It is important 
to highlight that Ethereum does not process multiple transactions from a single account in parallel. 
The blockchain follows the order that they were issued, which means that only after the first 
transaction sent is confirmed, the second is taken, and so on. Therefore, three different accounts 
are needed to examine the desired Gas price influence. 
Having that said, a custom version of the management interface was developed to reduce 
the time necessary to submit those transactions. Essentially, this changed interface enables the 
creation and use of three contracts, each of which offers a different Gas price for its transactions. 
The value is selected accordingly to the account currently in use in Metamask. However, even with 
those changes, it is not possible to send all three transactions simultaneously. It is still required to 
manually change between accounts in Metamask and approve each transaction manually. 
Nevertheless, they are executed shortly after one another under the assumption that a few seconds 
is not enough to have a significant change in the network dynamics that could affect the experiment. 
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 The detailed methodology is: 
1. Define a methodical set of test cases chronologically arranged – see Table 6.5; 
2. Define a fixed set of Ethereum accounts and the actors they correspond to – see Table 
6.6; 
3. Define three different Gas prices; 
4. Execute the test cases in the mainnet, using the same Metamask wallet account and the 
same browser of the base case experiment; 
4.1 For each test case, select the appropriate account in Metamask and execute the test 
case with the corresponding Gas price offer – start from the lowest Gas price, then 
do the medium, and finally, do the highest price; 
4.2 Execute the next test case only after the network confirms all three previous 
transactions; 
4.3 Record the smart contract address; 
4.4 Record the transactions number; 
4.5 Record both the submission and confirmation times obtained from the Metamask 
wallet log. 
Table 6.5 shows three possible callers for the first test case, but each Host must execute it 
exactly once. The following test cases refer to the “Respective Host” generally meaning the Actor 
that deployed the corresponding smart contract. For instance, GT3 is executed three times, once 
from each Host – Low, Medium, and High – where each of them interacts with the smart contract 
they deployed in GT1 using their address as the call argument. 
To address the third step of the methodology, the definition of Gas prices, the values 3, 6, 
and 12 Gwei (12x10-9 ETH) are used. The reason for that choice is to have a fixed multiplier factor 
difference between the prices to investigate the resulting impact they have in the latency. 
Table 6.5 – Set of tests for the Gas price experiment 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
GT1 Smart contract deploy Deploy 
 
Host Low   
Host Medium   
Host High 
GT2 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager PE3 Respective Host 





Table 6.5 Continue 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
GT4 Host turns exclusive on 
to self 
UC8.MSS Respective Host, 
1591027200 
Respective Host 
GT5 Host exclusive turns it 
off 
UC9.MSS  Respective Host 
GT6 Host removes Guest UC3.MSS Guest PE3 Respective Host 
GT7 Host removes Manager UC6.MSS Manager PE3 Respective Host 
Table 6.6 – Ethereum accounts for the Gas price experiment 
Actor Account address 
Host Low 0x71330E718D52b82506c14A18bE625C585F194b01 
Host Medium 0x470b57384Be9C15C9416958D8D35027a0b2a9f30 
Host High 0xcA18f8947783a38A61a710752673B3f5d0159F6F 
Guest PE3 0xc2596913A7283C727DF156f8F3a359c68559bBb2 
Manager PE3 0xDb0Dd99ffd184DcC1aD7C908a485E89A3a054935 
 
6.1.3 Evaluating cost 
 
A transaction cost in Ethereum is determined by its Gas consumption, measured in units of Gas. 
Each low-level Ethereum EVM operation has a determined Gas cost, and the transaction is charged 
according to the low-level steps it goes through. Two steps are necessary to arrive at the Canadian 
Dollar equivalent cost from the Gas consumption value. First, when submitting a transaction, users 
choose the Gas price in Ether (ETH), the Ethereum currency, they are willing to pay – see section 
6.1.1. Therefore, the transaction cost in ETH is a simple multiplication of the Gas consumption and 
the price offered. Second, the ETH price in Canadian Dollars is set by the market, how much people 
are willing to pay to have them. 
 This section proposes three experiments to evaluate the cost to run the smart contract: (i) a 
base case; (ii) a test network case; (iii) a multiplicity case. They enable a discussion about what the 
running cost expected for using the smart contract is, how the number of actors registered impact 





6.1.3.1 The base case experiment 
 
The same test set used by the performance base case can be used to assess cost. Since the execution 
of that experiment already yields the Gas consumption and Gas cost of the transactions, without 
requiring any extra step, it is not necessary to perform a new experiment. All that is needed for this 
base case cost evaluation is to record the Gas consumption registered when running the experiment 
6.1.2.1, obtaining the value from Etherscan. Observe that query call test cases – e.g., T2 “Host can 
open lock” - can be ignored since they are free of charge. 
Note that the execution of performance experiments two and three, network and gas price 
respectively, also provide Gas consumption values without any further work. Those observations 
are useful to compare Gas consumption consistency when performing the same action, for instance. 
For that reason, the Gas consumption registered when running those experiments must also be 
compiled, obtaining the value from Etherscan. 
In summary, the base case cost evaluation consists of gathering the Gas consumption data 
obtained through all three performance experiments. 
In addition to gathering Gas consumption, the ETH cost in Canadian Dollars (CAD) must 
be defined. The Coinbase (2020) website is used as it tracks the market value of ETH. The 
methodology is: 
1. Collect the Gas consumption and Gas price registered by all the transactions from the 
three performance experiments – see section 6.1.2 -, obtaining the values through the 
Etherscan website; 
2. Define the ETH cost in Canadian Dollars 
 
6.1.3.2 The test network experiment 
 
Having the base case evaluation executed in production brings an exciting opportunity for the 
second experiment, which is to evaluate the Gas consumption calculations issued by Görli. 
Differently from the performance experiments discussion, network dynamics do not influence the 
Gas consumption of a transaction. In other words, Ethereum test networks as Görli can and do 
emulate that value. However, it is not clear how accurate those calculations are.  
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This experiment to investigate the accuracy, then, is to repeat the transactions from the 
performance base case experiment methodically but using the Görli test network and ignoring 
transaction latency measurements. Observe that query call test cases – e.g., T2 “Host can open 
lock” - can be ignored since they are free of charge. The methodology in detail is: 
1. Methodically repeat all the transactions from the performance base case experiment 
from section 6.1.2.1 – see Table 6.7, which uses the same Ethereum accounts from 
Table 6.3; 
2. Execute the test cases in the Görli test network; 
2.1 Record the transaction number; 
2.2 Record the smart contract address; 
2.3 Record if the behavior matches the expectation – otherwise, it might yield a 
different cost caused by a wrong behavior; 
2.4 Record the Gas consumption obtained from the Etherscan website 
Table 6.7 – Set of tests for the network cost experiment 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
T1 Smart contract deploy Deploy 
 
Host 
T3 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 1 Host 
T5 Host tries to add existing Manager UC5.AP2 Manager 1 Host 
T6 Manager tries to add a new Manager UC5.AP1 Manager 2 Manager 1 
T7 Unknown tries to add new Manager UC5.AP1 Manager 2 Unknown 
T8 Host adds new Guest UC2.MSS Guest 1, 1583049600, 
1591027200 
Host 




T15 Guest tries to add a new Manager UC5.AP1 Manager 2 Guest 1 
T16 Guest tries to add Guest UC2.AP1 Guest 1, 1583049600, 
1592027220 
Guest 1 
T17 Unknown tries to add Guest UC2.AP1 Guest 1, 1583049600, 
1592027220 
Unknown 
T18 Host adds existing Guest UC2.AP2 Guest 1, 1583049600, 
1593027240 
Host 
T19 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 2 Host 




T30 Host turns exclusive on to self UC8.MSS Host, 1591027200 Host 
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Table 6.7 Continue 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
T34 Host exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Host 
T36 Manager tries to turn exclusive on to 
self 
UC8.AP2 Manager 1, 
1591027200 
Manager 1 
T37 Host turns exclusive on to Manager UC8.AP2 Manager 1, 
1591027200 
Host 
T42 Host tries to remove Manager that 
holds exclusive permission 
UC6.AP3 Manager 1 Host 
T43 Host adds new Manager while 
exclusive is on 
UC5.MSS Manager 3 Host 
T44 Host removes Manager while 
exclusive is on to other Manager 
UC6.AP2 Manager 3 Host 
T48 Host tries to turn exclusive off when 




T49 Manager exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Manager 1 





T51 Guest tries to turn exclusive on to 
self 
UC8.AP3 Guest 1, 1591027200 Guest 1 
T52 Unknown tries to turn exclusive on 
to Guest 
UC8.AP3 Guest 1, 1591027200 Unknown 
T53 Manager turns exclusive on to Guest UC8.AP1 Guest 1, 1591027200 Manager 1 
T54 Host tries to remove Guest that holds 
exclusive permission 
UC3.AP3 Guest 1 Host 
T55 Host removes Guest while exclusive 
is on to other Guest 
UC3.AP2 Guest Past Host 
T58 Host tries to turn exclusive on to 
Guest when already on 
UC8.AP4 Guest 1, 1591037220 Host 
T60 Guest exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Guest 1 
T61 Host tries to turn exclusive on to 
Future Guest 
UC8.AP5 Guest Future, 
1591037220 
Host 
T62 Host tries to turn exclusive on to 
Unknown 
UC8.AP5 Unknown, 1591037220 Host 
T63 Guest tries to remove Guest UC3.AP1 Guest Future Guest 1 
T64 Unknown tries to remove Guest UC3.AP1 Guest Future Unknown 
T65 Manager removes Guest UC3.MSS Guest Future Manager 2 
T66 Host tries to remove a not existing 
Guest 
UC3.AP4 Unknown Host 
T67 Guest tries to remove Manager UC6.AP1 Manager 2 Guest 1 
T68 Host removes Guest UC3.MSS Guest 1 Host 
T70 Manager tries to remove Manager UC6.AP1 Manager 2 Manager 1 
T71 Unknown tries to remove Manager UC6.AP1 Manager 1 Unknown 
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Table 6.7 Continue 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
T72 Host tries to remove a not existing 
Manager 
UC6.AP4 Unknown Host 
T73 Host removes Manager UC6.MSS Manager 1 Host 
T74 Host removes Manager UC6.MSS Manager 2 Host 
 
6.1.3.3 The multiplicity experiment 
 
Finally, the last experiment is set to evaluate if the quantity of Guests and Managers registered in 
the system modifies Gas consumption values. Note that, if the experiment from section 6.1.3.2 
shows that Görli correctly emulates the Gas consumption, the test network can be used to run the 
tests instead of using Ethereum mainnet. The methodology for this experiment is: 
1. Define a methodical set of test cases chronologically arranged – see Table 6.8; 
2. Define a fixed set of Ethereum accounts and the actors they correspond to – see Table 
6.9; 
3. Execute the test cases using the Görli test network instead of Ethereum mainnet: 
3.1 If experiment 6.1.3.2 shows that Görli’s Gas calculations match those yielded by 
the mainnet; 
4. Execution instructions: 
4.1 Record the transaction number; 
4.2 Record the smart contract address; 
4.3 Record the Gas consumption obtained from the Etherscan website. 
Table 6.8 – Set of tests for the multiplicity cost experiment 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
CT1 Smart contract deploy Deploy 
 
Host 
CT2 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 1 Host 
CT3 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 2 Host 
CT4 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 3 Host 
CT5 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 4 Host 
CT6 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 5 Host 
CT7 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 6 Host 
CT8 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 7 Host 
CT9 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 8 Host 
CT10 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 9 Host 
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Table 6.8 Continue 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
CT11 Host adds new Manager UC5.MSS Manager 10 Host 
CT12 Host adds new Guest UC2.MSS Guest 1, 1583049600, 
1591027200 
Host 
CT13 Host adds new Guest UC2.MSS Guest 2, 1583049600, 
1591027200 
Host 
CT14 Host adds new Guest UC2.MSS Guest 3, 1583049600, 
1591027200 
Host 
CT15 Host adds new Guest UC2.MSS Guest 4, 1583049600, 
1591027200 
Host 
CT16 Host adds new Guest UC2.MSS Guest 5, 1583049600, 
1591027200 
Host 
CT17 Manager adds new Guest UC2.MSS Guest 6, 1583049600, 
1591027200 
Manager 1 
CT18 Manager adds new Guest UC2.MSS Guest 7, 1583049600, 
1591027200 
Manager 1 
CT19 Manager adds new Guest UC2.MSS Guest 8, 1583049600, 
1591027200 
Manager 1 
CT20 Manager adds new Guest UC2.MSS Guest 9, 1583049600, 
1591027200 
Manager 1 




CT22 Host turns exclusive on to the first 
Manager 
UC8.AP2 Manager 1, 
1591027200 
Host 
CT23 Manager exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Manager 1 
CT24 Host turns exclusive on to the fifth 
Manager 
UC8.AP2 Manager 5, 
1591027200 
Host 
CT25 Manager exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Manager 5 
CT26 Host turns exclusive on to the tenth 
Manager 
UC8.AP2 Manager 10, 
1591027200 
Host 
CT27 Manager exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Manager 10 
CT28 Manager turns exclusive on to the 
first Guest 
UC8.AP1 Guest 1, 1591027200 Manager 1 
CT29 Guest exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Guest 1 
CT30 Manager turns exclusive on to the 
fifth Guest 
UC8.AP1 Guest 5, 1591027200 Manager 1 
CT31 Guest exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Guest 5 
CT32 Manager turns exclusive on to the 
tenth Guest 
UC8.AP1 Guest 10, 
1591027200 
Manager 1 
CT33 Guest exclusive turns it off UC9.MSS 
 
Guest 10 
CT34 Host removes fourth added Guest UC3.MSS Guest 4 Host 
CT35 Host removes eighth added Guest UC3.MSS Guest 8 Host 
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Table 6.8 Continue 
ID Short Description Use Case Call Arguments Caller 
CT36 Host removes sixth added Guest UC3.MSS Guest 6 Host 
CT37 Host removes second added Guest UC3.MSS Guest 2 Host 
CT38 Host removes tenth added Guest UC3.MSS Guest 10 Host 
CT39 Manager removes third added Guest UC3.MSS Guest 3 Manager 5 
CT40 Manager removes fifth added Guest UC3.MSS Guest 5 Manager 5 
CT41 Manager removes ninth added Guest UC3.MSS Guest 9 Manager 5 
CT42 Manager removes first added Guest UC3.MSS Guest 1 Manager 5 
CT43 Manager removes seventh added 
Guest 
UC3.MSS Guest 7 Manager 5 
CT44 Host removes sixth added Manager UC6.MSS Manager 6 Host 
CT45 Host removes fourth added Manager UC6.MSS Manager 4 Host 
CT46 Host removes ninth added Manager UC6.MSS Manager 9 Host 
CT47 Host removes second added 
Manager 
UC6.MSS Manager 2 Host 
CT48 Host removes tenth added Manager UC6.MSS Manager 10 Host 
CT49 Host removes first added Manager UC6.MSS Manager 1 Host 
CT50 Host removes fifth added Manager UC6.MSS Manager 5 Host 
CT51 Host removes eighth added Manager UC6.MSS Manager 8 Host 
CT52 Host removes third added Manager UC6.MSS Manager 3 Host 
CT53 Host removes seventh added 
Manager 
UC6.MSS Manager 7 Host 
Table 6.9 – Ethereum accounts for the multiplicity case cost experiment 
Actor Account address 
Host 0xcA18f8947783a38A61a710752673B3f5d0159F6F 
Manager 1 0x470b57384Be9C15C9416958D8D35027a0b2a9f30 
Manager 2 0x3d3bEcd44835ded70fB3820D3F9AA52aa3b308b3 
Manager 3 0xFd2a96AEA8E2C886915a031b80FEb3f099b719eb 
Manager 4 0x9847f30610f6F76363Ed5978d40841d89F4DE687 
Manager 5 0x71330E718D52b82506c14A18bE625C585F194b01 
Manager 6 0x3d1b95E8Dff394bfD428ae1aCA99C3681B2d5263 
Manager 7 0x4D71139A5DbC2d7d03e004f26B7B01AaB9EE18c7 
Manager 8 0x6CA44286bB7e7841E861BC9CeF912d09C24b9c46 
Manager 9 0x9c171798f4794F024e6bF93Bc5EC8766bda4F192 
Manager 10 0xB5274295A8820D6E6Bb735D939a776437310C16b 
Guest 1 0xc2596913A7283C727DF156f8F3a359c68559bBb2 
Guest 2 0xDCdb60D1A30a1335ae0Ed349F8f7A5C62dF70DfF 
Guest 3 0x6272803c8D64053ec2e2dF4730e179a47faF3d50 
Guest 4 0x38f30f7414287951167a62cab37bB7Fd133FE897 
Guest 5 0xDb0Dd99ffd184DcC1aD7C908a485E89A3a054935 
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Table 6.9 Continue 
Actor Account address 
Guest 6 0x67E551Cc0684c761Ab3f16f77C6d069792135B8D 
Guest 7 0x133a06D3408518C1c932f29Cf934fcb8568481A2 
Guest 8 0x30FBa3d2c2Ec41DBdeEE8506bdaDA71b6241d9dD 
Guest 9 0x6443992197f258A7c6f0696E3DaF2Dd522E0cA19 




This section presents and discusses the findings from the performance and cost evaluations defined 
in section 6.1, following the same order in which the experiments were introduced. Note that all 
the transactions were recorded in the public network they were executed – either Görli or Ethereum 
mainnet – and they can be viewed using the Etherscan website. 
 
6.2.1 Performance evaluation: The base case experiment 
 
The experiment’s procedure defined a set of seventy-five (75) sequential test cases comprised of 
both transactions and queries to the smart contract. The smart contract address is 
0xe4D483036750d386D1f9eee9F401c45b13a2cFcC. The experiment was performed on April 15, 
2020, approximately between 9:00 AM to 11:10 AM EDT. 
The use case behavior was verified along with each test case execution and all of them met 
their specification. Therefore, the smart contract functionalities are verified, and it works as 
expected. 
To measure query latency, the submission and response timestamps were provided by the 
management interface tool. The results are shown in Figure 6.22 – the y-axis is the latency 
measured in milliseconds, and the x-axis is the test case ID. First, note that all queries get an answer 
quickly, within a few hundred milliseconds generally. More precisely, approximately eighty (80) 
percent of the queries replied within one hundred (100) milliseconds. Those results mean that the 
architecture can deliver reasonable response times to retrieve data from the blockchain, including 
the unlock function that the door lock hardware relies on.  
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The two slowest queries – T22 and T23 - are related to retrieving the Guest list. As 
explained before and illustrated by Figure 6.6, this operation, to be fully completed, needs to query 
the smart contract G+1 times, where G is the number of Guests registered. Therefore, the higher 
the number of Guests, the longer it will take to retrieve them along with their permission 
information as described by the use case UC4. The wait, however, seems insufficient to affect the 
user experience or compromise the use case success. 
 
Figure 6.22 – Query latency 
To measure transaction (Tx) latency, the submission and confirmation times were acquired 
through the Metamask wallet log file, downloaded at the end of the experiment. At that moment, 
however, the log was missing data for the first three transactions of the experiment – i.e., test cases 
T1, T3, and T5. The wallet erased the records for those transactions apparently due to a capability 
limit on the account’s contract interaction history. Nevertheless, it is possible to verify that all 
transactions happened, and their respective information, using Etherscan – Table 6.10 brings their 
hashes. The problem is that Etherscan does not track submission time, it provides only the 
confirmation time of a transaction. For that reason, the latency for the first three test cases is not 
included in the results discussed next. It is crucial to note that the test cases T1, T3, and T5 were 
executed multiple times by other performance experiments and are discussed later in this work. 
Therefore, their absence here does not harm the proposed evaluation. 
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Table 6.10 – Excluded transactions from the performance base case analysis 
Item Tx Hash 
Tx T1 0x5dcf06331e862bed48de969d2a63a711f311540d84c223ee99a3d4695613b3cf 
Tx T3 0x0040715edb8ff93f7b4ffec72ecc65d082bcd9eb72e1c6b1467ba2d3a51ac8b0 
Tx T5 0xfd3e8e9a1cf5c435e270f92a15542aac5b2429b51911925bcd9c4d453bcac016 
As described by the methodology, the recommendation for the “Fast” Gas price was taken 
from the Ethereum Gas Station website at the beginning of the experiment, and the suggested value 
was eight Gwei (8x10-9 ETH). The transaction latency results are shown in Figure 6.23 – the y-axis 
is the latency measured in seconds, and the x-axis is the test case ID. First, observe that except for 
a single observation, all transactions were confirmed within one minute. As argued before, besides 
unlocking the door, none of the use cases are considered time-sensitive. Therefore, having a 
confirmation time under a couple of minutes seems realistic. 
 
Figure 6.23 – Performance evaluation base case: Transaction latency 
Note that Figure 6.23 sort the observations according to the latency values, causing the test 
case ID’s to be completely out of order – remember that those IDs also represent the execution 
sequence. Considering that the Gas price offered was the same for all the transactions, the chart 
shows how the network behavior changes dynamically. Looking at this figure alone, however, 
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might lead to an incomplete analysis. Each test case belongs to a different use case scenario and is 
performed by a different Actor. To draw a complete picture, each of those variables must be 
investigated for the latency results. Hence, Figure 6.24 shows the same latency chart but including 
three transaction properties to axis x, namely the use case, the scenario type – i.e., either the main 
success scenario or an alternative path -, and the Actor that executed it. 
The use case and Actor properties do not display any relationship with the transaction 
latency outcome. However, from the use case scenario type property, it is possible to infer that the 
main success scenarios (MSS) are typically confirmed faster by the network than the alternative 
paths (AP). That is a positive result, keeping in mind that many of those alternative paths would 
not happen often, as mentioned before, once the blockchain wallet would warn the user about the 
transaction failure in advance. 
 
Figure 6.24 – Performance evaluation base case: Transaction latency by its properties 
Finally, Figure 6.24 indicates that the Ethereum network behavior changes dynamically and 




Test case T43 shows the longest latency measured, which more than doubles the second-
highest value. There are many possible explanations for that behavior. To begin with, the network 
might have been too busy at that moment, with a high transaction volume, which could cause a 
higher latency for a transaction offering a Gas price of eight Gwei. It is also possible that the 
network slowed down the mining process for some consensus reason. Beyond the blockchain 
behavior, there is a chance that Metamask registered the wrong timestamp in the log file, which 
could be caused by a bug, by a problem in their backend service, or even by a local network issue 
at the machine running the experiment.  
For the transaction in question, Metamask registered a submission timestamp of 
1586960396, and confirmation 1586960551, hence the 155 seconds latency. Inspecting the 
transaction details in Etherscan – Tx hash 
0x922ec2822cf76178deffc9a1fc4d74a07df50248dc2e36fbdaa31a0ee7aa8741 -, the confirmation 
timestamp registered is 1586960513, 38 seconds earlier than Metamask. Although this value could 
support the Metamask delay issue hypothesis, it requires finding the confirmation difference 
between them for all other transactions – see Figure 6.25, where the y-axis is the confirmation 
timestamp difference in seconds (Metamask minus Etherscan), and the x-axis displays the test case 
ID. The chart shows that the timestamp confirmation discrepancy can go from six seconds up to 
forty-nine (49) seconds, and therefore it does not enable drawing a conclusion on the outlier value 
found for the test case T43 transaction. 
The timestamp shown by Etherscan is equal to the block creation timestamp in which the 
transaction was confirmed, and it shows the value that is recorded in the Ethereum network, not a 
value they measured locally at their website server. In fact, various Etherscan timestamp values are 
even lower than the submission timestamp recorded by Metamask, a fact that indicates that they 
were operating under a distinct clock. On the other hand, this evidence does not explain the high 
variance found in the timestamp comparison. The best hypothesis is that Metamask relies on a 
signal to trigger the confirmation event at the local machine and that for some reason – e.g., internet 
issues - the wallet had some delays to get or process it.  
It is crucial to remark that once Etherscan does not track submission timestamps, the 
blockchain wallet is still the best option to measure transaction latency. In addition to that, the 
experiments seek to investigate the system’s performance under the user’s point of view, and the 
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blockchain wallet is the user’s gateway to send transactions to the blockchain. Consequently, it 
strengths the Metamask timestamps as the best choice.  
 
Figure 6.25 – Performance evaluation base case: Confirmation timestamp comparison between 
Metamask and Etherscan 
In summary, the performance experiment base case shows that: 
• The smart contract behavior matches the use case requirements; 
• All queries to the blockchain have reasonable response time; 
• All transactions have a feasible confirmation latency – considering the Gas price set at 
the “Fast” price recommendation at the beginning of the experiment; 
• The Ethereum network performance appears to change constantly; 
• The Metamask account log must be downloaded after every transaction performed to 
avoid data loss; 
• Metamask and Etherscan timestamps are neither equivalent nor comparable; 
• Although Metamask displays some inconsistencies when measuring latency, it is still 





6.2.2 Performance evaluation: The network dynamics experiment 
 
The experiment’s procedure defined a set of fifteen (15) sequential test cases, being a subset of 
those transactions from the base case evaluation. It also established a fixed Gas price offer of eight 
Gwei (8x10-9 ETH) for all transactions, matching the previous experiment price. The test set was 
executed four times as following: 
• On April 16, 2020, from 9:00 AM to approximately 9:55 AM EDT – smart contract 
address 0xCa0b9f3Cd393D4768Fe060ADAAb2cB8067bC5BD7; 
• On April 16, 2020, from 6:00 PM to approximately 6:30 PM EDT – smart contract 
address 0xc4C068404dA742b169a88dd2E2d30d4b243B29DD; 
• On April 19, 2020, from 9:00 AM to approximately 9:30 AM EDT – smart contract 
address 0x5E349E3D973a876BeAcF6B3EF1A3D9723b595f5C; 
• On April 19, 2020, from 6:01 PM to approximately 6:25 PM EDT – smart contract 
address 0x1B938BA5ac432046Cd9e6277424F68dA75cBACD9. 
The latency results are shown in Figure 6.26 – the log2 scale y-axis is the latency measured 
in seconds, the x-axis is the test case ID, and each bar represents one of the four executions. To 
begin with, from a total of sixty (60) transactions, eighty-five (85) percent had a latency time under 
sixty (60) seconds. Moreover, only a couple of transactions took more than two minutes to get a 
confirmation, and they both happened on the 9:00 AM EDT procedure from April 16. As 
mentioned before, those values are realistic to the use cases and support the proposed architecture. 
In addition to that, Figure 6.26 displays the dynamic changes that happen in the Ethereum 
network. The same transaction, offering the same Gas price, performed in a different day, or time 
of the day, yielded various latency values, without any consistency. Figure 6.27 brings an 
alternative view to that chart that compares transaction latency between the four executions – the 
y-axis is the latency share, i.e., how much the given latency amount represents of the test case’s 
total, and the x-axis is the test case ID. Observe that although the first test set run needed almost 
twice the time to complete than the following three trials, only one-third of their transactions took 




Figure 6.26 – Network dynamics performance evaluation: Latency 
 
Figure 6.27 – Network dynamics performance evaluation: Latency share 
The transaction with the overall highest latency is from test case T1, the smart contract 




Metamask and Etherscan timestamps cannot be compared as explained earlier, it can provide at 
least an evidence that indicates if either Metamask had any issue to log the confirmation, or the 
network took more time to process it. Furthermore, since that is the transaction that started the 
evaluation, its submission time is established exactly at 9:00 AM EDT, which takes the Metamask 
submission time out of the equation. According to Etherscan, that transaction was confirmed at 
9:16:50 AM EDT – i.e., 1010 seconds -, which is close to the 1014 seconds yielded by Metamask. 
Therefore, it is possible to affirm that the network indeed took more time to confirm that 
transaction. However, the reason does not seem to be related to the test case action of deploying 
the smart contract once its three other executions took Ethereum under sixty (60) seconds to 
confirm. 
The transaction with the second-highest latency is from test case T30, also on the April 16 
at 9:00 AM EDT execution – Tx hash 
0x3cc78d5045ef86a3d9d885f8e08d9c2e2c16904e8dc16e69f97235cfd68c284a. Etherscan shows 
the confirmation at 9:34:26 AM EDT, while Metamask logged it at 9:34:32 AM EDT, extremely 
close once again. Even though there is no submission time to rely upon besides the Metamask log, 
it is feasible to infer that the network actually took more time to process that transaction. And, 
similarly as before, it does not seem to be related to the test case action when the three other 
observations for T30 are considered - twenty-nine (29), one hundred and one (101), and thirty-nine 
(39) seconds respectively. 
In summary, the network dynamics performance experiment shows that: 
• The Ethereum network performance changes constantly; 
• Following the “Fast” Gas price from the base case experiment, eighty-five (85) percent 
of the transactions were confirmed in less than one minute, whereas ninety-seven (97) 
percent were processed in less than two minutes. 
 
6.2.3 Performance evaluation: The Gas price experiment 
 
The experiment’s procedure defined a set of seven sequential test cases. Each of them was executed 
three times, offering three different prices of Gas – three, six, and twelve (12) Gwei. The smart 
contracts created by the deploy test case GT1 for each Gas price category were: 
• Low price – contract address 0x1e9769e79a656ef48093273c65ca229670a4bb62; 
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• Medium price – contract address 0x6c625f3bf4cfa4c75b91a6d7135ab8888c03e3fb; 
• High price – contract address 0x3173ae8AE0fDc8AE1C9aD662e24E0BC62cD01Bb8. 
To compare latency results between the Gas price offers, the transactions for a given test 
case were sent in the order defined – from the lowest to the biggest offer -, and as soon as possible, 
to minimize the network dynamics effect.  
However, the Metamask wallet could not handle quick interactions and slowed down to 
show the next transaction for approval and to change between the Actors’ account afterward, 
causing an undesired delay between submissions. Figure 6.28 shows the amount of time elapsed 
between each test case transaction and the corresponding low gas price submission – the y-axis is 
the test case Tx submission time for the respective Gas price minus the low Gas price Tx 
submission time – i.e., the delay -, and the x-axis is the test case ID. Unfortunately, the delays 
between the steps were too long, generally over forty (40) seconds, compromising the proposed 
analysis. The reason is that, due to those long intervals, it is not reasonable to isolate the network 
dynamics impact on the results. 
 
Figure 6.28 – Gas price performance evaluation: Time elapsed between Tx submissions 
Although it is not feasible to draw exact conclusions on the Gas price and latency 
relationship, the data still offers some insights about the network behavior in general. It is crucial 
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to highlight that, contrary to the base case and network dynamics evaluations, the test cases of this 
experiment did not happen on the same day. Figure 6.29 shows the latency results – the log2 y-axis 
is the latency measured in seconds, the x-axis is both the test case ID and the respective low Gas 
Tx submission date (EDT). Each bar in the chart represents a Gas price offer. 
First, note that all transactions offering the high Gas price were confirmed under one 
minute. Second, note that both test cases that started in the morning – GT1 and GT4 – display 
extremely high latency for both medium and low Gas prices. Considering that those values are 
significantly higher than the time elapsed between their submissions, it is possible to infer that the 
network was busy at that moment, which led to meaningful latency discrepancies based on the Gas 
offer. Moreover, observe that for most of the other test cases, the latency did not exhibit an 
expressive disparity. 
Finally, those results suggest that high Gas price offers can keep the latency in a reasonable 
value regardless of the network condition. Whereas lower offers might yield equally low latencies 
but are more vulnerable to network changes. 
 
 
Figure 6.29 – Gas price performance evaluation: Latency 
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6.2.4 Cost evaluation: The base case experiment 
 
The experiment procedure did not require any additional testing, because all the transactions from 
previous experiments yielded the amount of Gas required to execute them. Although some of those 
transactions offered different Gas prices for the same test case, the Gas consumption is the same, 
only the final cost in ETH – Gas used multiplied by the Gas price – is affected.  
Note that the Gas price choice directly impacts the transaction cost and, as shown before, 
its resulting latency. As a consequence, the Gas price used for this analysis is twelve (12) Gwei, 
because it was consistently able to get transactions confirmed under one minute. 
 As defined by the procedure, the ETH cost in CAD must be obtained from the Coinbase 
website, and, as of April 29, 2020, at 02:08 PM, the value of 1 ETH was CAD 296.75. 
 Figure 6.30 shows the Gas consumption of the performance experiment base case 
transactions – the log2 left y-axis is the unit of Gas used by the transaction, the log2 right y-axis is 
the respective cost in CAD, and the x-axis is the test case ID with the corresponding use case ID.  
 
Figure 6.30 – Cost evaluation: Performance base case Gas consumption 
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First, observe that the most expensive operation is the smart contract deploy – test case T01 
– costing CAD 6.63 (1,862,258 Gas units). Although a relevant sum of money, the deploy is a one-
time-only action. Besides that, all other transactions yielded costs below forty (40) cents, where 
the second most expensive use case is register Guest (UC2.MSS), followed by register Manager 
(UC5.MSS), and turn on the exclusive permission (UC8.MSS, AP1, and AP2). 
 In general, those costs are believed to be too low to be prohibitive, especially considering 
the application context. For example, when someone needs to constantly alter the smart contract, 
it could mean that multiple rents are happening, which can dilute the costs to manage the door lock. 
On the other hand, a domestic setting would hardly demand constant changes, keeping those 
expenses low and sparse over time. 
The following sections expand the cost analysis for each use case, including results from 




The smart contract deploy was executed a total of eight times, from different Actor accounts, and 
consistently yielded a Gas consumption of 1,862,258 Gas units, which amounts to CAD 6.63 - 
considering the Gas price at 12 Gwei. For a one time only operation, the value seems reasonable 
considering the application context. Take into consideration that if low latency is not required, that 
price can drop significantly – i.e., CAD 1.66 at three Gwei. 
 
6.2.4.2 UC2 – Register Guest 
 
Figure 6.31 shows all seventeen (17) transactions related to registering a Guest – the y-axis is the 
units of Gas used, the x-axis is the test and use cases IDs, and above each column is the respective 
cost in Canadian Dollars. 
There are five different Gas consumption values, though one of them is not visible in the 
chart. At the same time, note that among the same test case, the Gas consumption was consistently 
the same. To support the discussion, Figure 6.32 reveals the implementation for the registerGuest 




Figure 6.31 – Cost evaluation: Register Guest 
 
Figure 6.32 – Function registerGuest implementation 
Starting from UC2.AP1, this alternative path represents a failed transaction – e.g., someone 
other than the Host or a Manager trying to add a Guest. Hence, only the identity check at the 
eitherOwnerOrManager modifier happens, and nothing is stored in the smart contract, keeping 
those costs low. 
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 Use case UC2.AP2 is an alternative path where the Host registers a Guest that is already 
registered, in which case only updates the start and expiry dates – it skips lines 50 and 51. 
Therefore, it requires more computation than UC2.AP1, but less than to register a new Guest. 
Next, the other three values are 108,424 (T08), 113,591 (T09), and 113,615 (T20) Gas units, 
where the second and third amounts represent approximately a five percent increase from T08. 
Two main characteristics distinguish between those test cases: (i) the Host registers the Guest in 
T08, while the Manager does it in both other cases; (ii) the Host always register the first Guest 
(T08), followed by the Manager adding the second (T09) and third Guests (T20).  
To allow the registration, the function initially verifies the caller’s identity using the 
eitherOwnerOrManager modifier. The process to verify if the address sending the transaction is a 
Manager involves more computational steps than what is required to check the Host identity, 
consequently rising the cost – see Figure 6.33. This explains the extra charge from T08 to T09. 
On the other hand, the cost to add the third Guest (T20) had a subtle increase from T09, 
which can be explained by either the push method slightly raising the cost according to the array 
size, or by the different Guest address, start date, and expiry date used. 
 
Figure 6.33 – Modifier eitherOwnerOrManager and function isManager implementations 
 
6.2.4.3 UC3 – Remove Guest 
 
Figure 6.34 shows all eighteen (18) transactions related to remove a Guest – the y-axis is the units 





Figure 6.34 – Cost evaluation: Remove Guest 
 There are six different Gas consumption values, though two of them are not distinguishable 
looking at the chart – T66 and T65. On the other hand, among the same test case, Gas consumption 
was consistently equal. To support the discussion, Figure 6.35 reveals the implementation for the 
removeGuest function – see sequence diagrams 6.1.3.4 and 6.1.3.5 for details. 
 
Figure 6.35 – Function removeGuest implementation 
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Similarly to UC2.AP1, UC3.AP1 represents a failed transaction – e.g., someone other than 
the Host or a Manager trying to remove a Guest, which stops the execution at the identity check. 
UC3.AP3 also fails because the Host is trying to remove a Guest that holds the exclusive 
permission, stopping at the second function modifier. The last failing use case is UC3.AP4, where 
the Host tries to remove someone not registered as a Guest, error identified at line 64, aborting the 
execution. Therefore, those three failed transactions use distinct amounts of Gas as they quit the 
function at different points. 
Observe that UC3.MSS is executed by two test cases, T65 and T68. Two main 
characteristics distinguish between those test cases: (i) The Host removes the Guest in T68, while 
the Manager does it in T65; (ii) T65 removes one of two Guests registered, and T68 removes the 
last one.  
As explained before, the identity check for a Manager requires more work than verifying a 
Host, consequently using more units of Gas. Furthermore, the function removeGuest 
implementation shows that, when the array of Guests has only one address stored, lines sixty-seven 
(67) and sixty-eight (68) are not executed. Thus, both aspects have an impact on the resulting cost. 
Finally, test case T55 costs slightly less than T65, and both remove a Guest with the 
respective array size larger than one. In this case, however, the Host executes the action instead of 
the Manager, and it happens while the exclusive permission is turned on to another Guest. 
Therefore, there is less work to check the identity, but more effort to verify that the Guest is not 
the exclusive permission holder. 
 
6.2.4.4 UC5 – Register Manager 
 
Figure 6.36 shows all eighteen (18) transactions related to registering a Manager – the y-axis is the 
units of Gas used, the x-axis is both the test and use cases IDs, and above each column is the 
respective cost in Canadian Dollars. 
There are four different Gas consumption values but among the same test case, the Gas 
consumption was consistently the same. To support the discussion, Figure 6.37 reveals the 





Figure 6.36 – Cost evaluation: Register Manager 
 
Figure 6.37 – Function registerManager implementation 
Similarly to previous discussions, UC5.AP1 and UC5.AP2 are prohibited actions that result 
in failed transactions. The former is someone other than the Host trying to register a Manager, and 
the latter is the Host trying to add an existing Manager. Their subtle Gas consumption discrepancy 
relates to where the code execution stops, one at the onlyOwner modifier and the other at line 
seventy-nine (79). 
 Test cases T03, T19, and T43 executes the use case UC5.MSS, and all of them have the 
Host adding a new Manager to the smart contract. Test case T43 adds a third Manager while the 
exclusive permission feature is turned on to someone, but this is not relevant to this function – i.e., 
it does not check anything related to that as shown by the implementation. 
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 Finally, the first Manager registration consumes slightly fewer Gas units than the following 
additions, suggesting that the array size indeed alters the push method cost. 
 
6.2.4.5 UC6 – Remove Manager 
 
Figure 6.38 shows all nineteen (19) transactions related to remove a Manager – the y-axis is the 
units of Gas used, the x-axis is both the test and use cases IDs, and above each column is the 
respective Dollar amount. 
 
Figure 6.38 – Cost evaluation: Remove Manager 
 There are six different Gas consumption values, though one of them is not recognizable 
looking at the chart – T72. For the first time, the same test case yielded two distinguished costs, 
namely T73. However, the cheapest T73 transactions, identified with a * symbol, were executed in 
the Gas price performance experiment, and, in that case, only a single manager was registered in 
the smart contract. Those expensive T73 transactions were removing the second to last Manager in 
both other experiments. Therefore, the test cases T73* are, in fact, equivalent to T74 of the 




Figure 6.39 reveals the implementation for the removeManager function – see sequence 
diagrams 6.1.3.10 and 6.1.3.11 for details. Since the removeManager implementation, use cases, 
and cost behavior are highly similar to removeGuest, their cost analyses are also equivalent. For 
that reason, no further discussion is necessary here. 
 
Figure 6.39 – Function removeManager implementation 
 
6.2.4.6 UC8 – Turn on exclusive permission 
 
Figure 6.40 shows all twenty-four (24) transactions related to turning on the exclusive feature – the 
y-axis is the units of Gas used, the x-axis is both the test and use cases IDs, and above each column 
is the respective cost in Canadian Dollars. 
There are eight different Gas consumption values, though one of them is not distinguishable 
looking at the chart – T51. On the other hand, among the same test case, Gas consumption was 
consistently the same. To support the discussion, Figure 6.41 reveals the implementation for the 
turnExclusiveFeatureOn function – see sequence diagrams 6.1.3.14 and 6.1.3.15 for details. 
Similar to previous discussions, some alternative paths represent prohibited actions that 
result in failed transactions, therefore consuming small amounts of Gas. In this case, those 
scenarios are: (i) UC8.AP4, where the Host tries to turn the feature on when it is already on; (ii) 
UC8.AP3, where someone other than the Host or a Manager tries to turn the feature on; (iii) 
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UC8.AP5, when the Host tries to turn the feature on to someone without permission to unlock the 
door; (iv) UC8.AP2, where a Manager tries to turn the feature on to itself. 
 
Figure 6.40 – Cost evaluation: Turn on exclusive permission 
 
Figure 6.41 – Function turnExclusiveFeatureOn implementation 
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Use case UC8.MSS is the Host turning the feature on to itself, whereas in UC8.AP2 the 
Host turns it on to a Manager, both having the same expiry date. Their resulting cost differs by only 
995 units of Gas can be attributed to the unlock method call to verify if the desired exclusive 
permission holder can open the lock. Once again, a Manager requires more steps than the Host. 
Test case T53 is performed by a Manager, turning the feature on to a Guest. Besides the 
usual extra work to check the identity and the unlock method call to a Guest – the most complex 
stakeholder to validate the ability to unlock the device -, it requires an extra validation of conditions 
– refer to line one hundred and twenty-four (124). Hence the highest cost. 
 
6.2.4.7 UC9 – Turn off exclusive permission 
 
Figure 6.42 shows all twenty (20) transactions related to turning off the exclusive permission 
feature – the y-axis is the units of Gas used, the x-axis is the test and use cases IDs, and above each 
column is the respective Dollar amount. 
 
Figure 6.42 – Cost evaluation: Turn off exclusive permission 
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There are three different Gas consumption values but among the same test case, the Gas 
consumption was consistently equal. To support the discussion, Figure 6.43 reveals the 
implementation for the turnExclusiveFeatureOff function – see sequence diagrams 6.1.3.16 and 
6.1.3.17 for details. 
 
Figure 6.43 – Function turnExclusiveFeatureOff implementation 
 Use case UC9.MSS, where the permission holder successfully turns the feature off, is 
executed by three test cases, T34, T49, and T60. The distinction between them is who the 
permission holder is and, consequently, who is calling the function, respectively the Host, a 
Manager, and a Guest.  
However, note that this function is the simplest in terms of access control among all others 
discussed. As long as the person calling holds the exclusive permission, the function runs, and it 
does not care if that someone is the Host, a Manager, or a Guest. Furthermore, it does not insert 
any additional data to the smart contract, it only changes the value for a couple of variables already 
created. That is the reason why the use case UC9.MSS is the cheapest one, as shown in Figure 
6.30. 
Finally, UC9.AP1 and UC9.AP2 are alternative paths that result in transaction failure. The 
former is the Host trying to turn the feature off when it is already off, and the latter is the Host 
trying to turn it off when someone else holds the permission. Ethereum charges unsuccessful 
transactions a base Gas amount plus the computational steps executed to reach that conclusion. 
 
6.2.5 Cost evaluation: The test network experiment 
 
The experiment’s procedure established a set of forty-three (43) sequential test cases, more 
specifically formed by all the transactions from the performance experiment base case, to be 
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executed using the Görli test network. The smart contract address is 
0x21Be6d84605607989934Cf5294e789dD681c8297 and can also be viewed using Etherscan 
when Görli is selected.  
The test case behaviors were verified along with each execution as defined in the 
methodology, and all of them met the specification. Furthermore, all transactions resulted in the 
same Gas charge yielded by Ethereum mainnet. 
In conclusion, the Görli testnet perfectly emulates the Gas calculations of the Ethereum 
main network. 
  
6.2.6 Cost evaluation: The multiplicity experiment 
 
The experiment’s procedure defined a set of fifty-three (53) sequential transactions, which were 
executed using the Görli test network due to the results reported in the previous section. The smart 
contract address is 0xEf007eE1d68A16AF5D005caBF543CDA61F20Ea8c. The following 
paragraphs present and discuss the findings for each use case. 
 Figure 6.44 shows the Gas consumption of ten Guest registrations, ordered by execution – 
the y-axis is the units of Gas used, and the x-axis is both the Actor doing the transaction and the 
test case ID. As explained before based on the implementation, the first Guest is cheaper to register 
due to less work required to complete the action. After that, the only Gas charge change happens 
from CT16 to CT17, exactly when the Manager starts adding Guests, surcharge also discussed 
before. In conclusion, the number of Guests registered in the smart contract only impacted the cost 
when none was registered. 
 Figure 6.45 shows the Gas consumption of ten Manager registrations, ordered by execution 
– the y-axis is the units of Gas used, and the x-axis is the test case ID. Remember that only the Host 
can successfully register Managers. Similarly to registering Guests, the number of Managers only 




Figure 6.44 – Multiplicity cost evaluation: Register Guest (UC2.MSS) 
 
Figure 6.45 – Multiplicity cost evaluation: Register Manager (UC5.MSS) 
Figure 6.46 shows the Gas consumption of ten Guest removals, ordered by execution – the 
y-axis is the units of Gas used, and the x-axis is both the Actor doing the transaction and the test 
case ID. As expected, the chart shows the price increase when changing the stakeholder from the 
Host to a Manager. Then, the last three transactions, therefore the last three Guests removed from 
the smart contract, required lower Gas than the others.  
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The fact that the last removal used the least amount of Gas was expected following the 
results from section 6.2.4.3. For CT41, the reason is the position that the Guest occupies in the 
array. To remove a Guest from the smart contract, it must be in the last position of the Guest array 
– see Figure 6.35. CT41 is the only test case in which the Guest being removed is already in the 
last position. CT42 requires a position swap, but between the first and last elements, which 
consumed slightly less Gas than CT39 and CT40. Therefore, to remove Guests, the Gas 
consumption might change according to the Guest quantity and the respective array position 
occupied by the desired address. 
 
Figure 6.46 – Multiplicity cost evaluation: Remove Guest (UC3.MSS) 
Figure 6.47 shows the Gas consumption of ten Manager removals, ordered by execution – 
the y-axis is the units of Gas used, and the x-axis is the test case ID. Remember that only the Host 
can successfully remove a Manager. Once again, this discussion is similar to removeGuest since 
they share most of the implementation strategy, including removal by position swapping. 
The first four Managers are positioned in the middle of the array, hence the higher cost. 
CT48, on the other hand, was already positioned at the last position. The next four Managers – 
CT49 to CT52 - were always located at the first position of the array, requiring a swap between the 




Figure 6.47 – Multiplicity cost evaluation: Remove Manager (UC6.MSS) 
Figure 6.48 shows the Gas amount required to turn on the exclusive permission, ordered by 
execution – the y-axis is the units of Gas used, and the x-axis is the use case ID. Use case UC8.AP2 
is the Host turning the feature on to three Managers, each located either at the beginning, the 
middle, or at the end of the Manager’s array. Therefore, the Manager position does not impact the 
cost of that use case. 
Use case UC8.AP1 is the Manager turning the feature on to three Guests, each located either 
at the beginning, the middle, or at the end of the Guest’s array. Once again, the Gas consumption 
does not change according to the Guest position. 
The surcharge of UC8.AP1 in comparison to UC8.AP2 was explained earlier in section 
6.2.4.6. 
Finally, Figure 6.49 shows the cost to turn off the exclusive permission feature (UC9.MSS), 
ordered by execution – the y-axis is the units of Gas used, and the x-axis is who is the Actor 
performing the transaction. 
In accordance with the findings and analysis of section 6.2.4.7, the cost to turn off the 





Figure 6.48 – Multiplicity cost evaluation: Turn the exclusive feature on (UC8.AP1 and 
UC8.AP2) 
 







CHAPTER 7  
  
CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTION, AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This work proposes, implements, and evaluates a smart lock system built using the Ethereum 
blockchain. The system allows a person to have full control of their device and manage it remotely 
without requiring a central authority – e.g., the lock’s manufacturer - to host and administrate the 
solution. 
 The architecture discussion in chapter four addresses the first research question and 
objective – how a smart lock solution can be implemented using a permissionless blockchain. It 
creates a detailed application scenario in which various functionalities are required from the smart 
lock and proposes an architecture capable of meeting those needs. The discussion demonstrates 
how complex it is to build an application that properly embraces decentralization and the many 
aspects and components that should be considered when doing so. Moreover, it shows that poorly 
designed solutions can use the blockchain but still face some of the same issues encountered when 
using centralized applications. 
 From a different perspective and at a lower level of abstraction, chapter five also addresses 
the first research question and objective. The discussion surrounding the smart contract 
implementation shows that data privacy and security must be accounted for when writing every 
function. If they are not designed properly, the smart contract can expose sensitive data or allow 
unauthorized users to perform actions that they are not supposed to. Furthermore, it debates on the 
tradeoffs associated with some design decisions as, for example, when to use a transaction or a 
query-based function and the corresponding access control security and delay to process the call. 
In summary, chapters four and five show that it is possible to design the desired smart lock 
solution, how it looks like, how it is implemented, and how it works. In addition to that, it highlights 
the impact that some architecture and implementation decisions can have on the system behavior. 
The experiments and evaluations from chapter six address the remaining research questions 
and objectives, related to the system behavior, performance, and cost. First, it shows that the system 
delivers the expected behavior to all the test cases. Therefore, it demonstrates that the architecture 
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and implementation are indeed capable of meeting the needs and use cases described throughout 
this work.  
Regarding the performance, the evaluation shows that the delay to retrieve data from the 
blockchain – i.e., from the smart contract – is in the milliseconds' range. On the other hand, it also 
reveals that transaction delays – i.e., sending data to the smart contract – are affected by many 
factors but that there is a mechanism that users can leverage to keep them low, offering higher gas 
prices. Regardless of the network dynamics, a Gas price of twelve Gwei was able to keep the 
transaction delays under one minute. Besides unlocking the lock, which is a data retrieval operation 
that happens in milliseconds, all the other actions are not time-sensitive, meaning that delays of a 
few minutes are acceptable and do not compromise the applicability of the proposed solution. 
The cost evaluation adopted the high Gas price mentioned above to calculate the cost of 
each use case scenario representing a worst-case scenario – users less sensitive to longer waiting 
times could offer lower Gas prices, consequently paying less money. The evaluation shows that, 
even with that consideration, the most expensive action is to deploy the smart contract, which costs 
approximately seven CAD. This deployment, however, is a one-time-only operation performed 
when setting up the device. Besides that, all other transactions yielded costs between five and forty 
cents. Therefore, the results suggest that the costs are reasonable considering the application and 
the benefits of the proposed system. 
In conclusion, this work shows that it is possible and feasible to leverage the public 




The limitations of this work are: 
• Lock’s hardware development: This device plays a crucial role in the success of the 
proposed solution and must be carefully designed to support the use cases securely for 
all stakeholders. It was out of the scope of this work due to its high complexity, which 
is believed to require a thesis of its own. For instance, additional use cases and 
considerations for the application might be necessary – e.g., how to set up and keep the 
smart contract address of the device, how the stakeholders' identities are verified, how 
to allow the smart contract address to be changed without compromising the 
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stakeholders' rights over the device, and how to deal with an unavailable internet 
connection. 
• Use cases: (i) Only a single Guest can hold the exclusive permission feature, but it could 
be necessary to enable others to have it simultaneously – e.g., a couple or a group of 
friends staying at a place might not want to rely on single permission; (ii) The smart 
contract only allows a single Host to exist, but it could be necessary to have multiple 
people with the same rights over the device. 
• User experience: (i) Once the lock’s management interface does not keep any state 
saved, users must store they smart contract address somewhere and inform it every time 
they open the tool; (ii) Users are required to exchange their Ethereum accounts and 
smart contract addresses to manage the device; (iii) The architecture would allow a 
malicious Host to trick a Guest by creating a fake smart contract that is not the one 
being used by the lock device. 
• Privacy: As discussed before, information as the start and end dates of stays, and the 
address of the Guests and Managers, for instance, can be obtained through the records 
of the blockchain transactions. 
• Cost: Although the Gas amount charged by the transactions are fixed, the corresponding 




The contributions of this work are: 
• The early version of this work was published (De Camargo Silva et al., 2019). 
• Architecture and implementation: The in-depth discussion surrounding the required 
components, issues, and factors that must be taken into consideration when designing 
and developing an application that leverages the blockchain; 
• Evaluations: It shows that it is possible and feasible to build and use the proposed smart 
lock solution using the Ethereum blockchain while demonstrating its tradeoffs. 
• Architecture, implementation, and evaluations: Sets a foundation that can be extended 
to build many other applications as gym and school lockers, self-storage facilities, 
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access control to workplaces, hospitality services, other physical properties, among 
others. It provides an initial idea about expected costs and performance for that kind of 
application. 
 
7.3 Future Work 
  
Some possibilities for future works associated with this thesis are: 
• Develop the lock device hardware discussed in this architecture; 
• Address the limitations presented in section 7.1; 
• Build other access control applications based on this architecture as suggested in section 
7.2; 
• Substitute Ethereum with other public blockchains, or even with private or consortium 
blockchains, and contrast the architecture, implementation, tradeoffs, behavior, 
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